Showing posts with label timo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label timo. Show all posts
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Seeing the Forest for Its Hedges
Under the category of shameless self promotion, here is a link to an article in last Sunday's New York Times written by Tim Gray and entitled "Seeing the Forest for Its Hedges". It discusses different options for investing in timberland (TIMOs, REITs, ETFs and direct investment of smaller tracts). --Brian
Monday, June 21, 2010
New Timberland Transaction Update
The pace of timberland transactions is still pretty slow but they are occurring (about 500,000 acres since my update last fall) and prices do not appear to have dropped below those of late last year. I think the 10% - 15% decline estimate (from the peak) is still pretty solid. In some places it is more than that, some locations, less. The NCREIF index continues to show declining timberland values but the total decline from the peak is only about 7% as of the end of Q1. The capital appreciation component of the index, which measures change in market value, fell 6.17% last year and another 0.84% in Q1. Given the lagging and "smoothing" nature of the index, we will probably see it continue to decline modestly.
The list below represents the significant transactions since my last update.
Changing discount rates used by buyers and sellers are the key to changing timberland valuations. As discount rates go up, valuation goes down.
The 2009 Q4 Brookfield Global Timberlands Research Report, distributed by Forestweb, stated that "Most appraisers are currently applying discount rates of + 6.0% (real) ... This represents an increase of 25 - 100+ bps Y/Y which should equate to a 4 - 15 percent reduction in timberland values when using a discounted cash flow analysis." In a presentation earlier this month by Plum Creek at the NAREIT Institutional Investor Forum, they estimated that discount rates have increased by about 1% which would put it right at the 15% reduction. On the other hand, a recent article discussing office building REITs suggested that discount rates were actually beginning to move down!
The graph below, which shows the relationship between discount rates and timberland prices, was produced by Jim Rinehart with R&A Investment Forestry.
Jim cautions that there are some inherent weaknesses in the individual data points due to the way the data was constructed. Be that as it may, the value of the graph is in the trend lines. And the trend is clear. The graph was taken from a paper titled "U.S. Timberland post-recession. Is it the same asset?" The paper is well worth reading and can be downloaded from his web site here.
The clear point is that there remains uncertainty in the market about discount rates and the direction of timberland values. My personal opinion is that we will not see big shifts in either direction in the short run but you had better pay attention to what is happening. Remember, timberland is not a very liquid investment as has been borne out by the limited transactions being reported.
If I have missed any sales, or have any errors, please send me an email at jbfiacco@gmail.com. As always, comments and differing opinions are appreciated (especially when supported by facts!). --Brian
Visit my web site at www.timberlandstrategies.com
The list below represents the significant transactions since my last update.
Changing discount rates used by buyers and sellers are the key to changing timberland valuations. As discount rates go up, valuation goes down.
The 2009 Q4 Brookfield Global Timberlands Research Report, distributed by Forestweb, stated that "Most appraisers are currently applying discount rates of + 6.0% (real) ... This represents an increase of 25 - 100+ bps Y/Y which should equate to a 4 - 15 percent reduction in timberland values when using a discounted cash flow analysis." In a presentation earlier this month by Plum Creek at the NAREIT Institutional Investor Forum, they estimated that discount rates have increased by about 1% which would put it right at the 15% reduction. On the other hand, a recent article discussing office building REITs suggested that discount rates were actually beginning to move down!
The graph below, which shows the relationship between discount rates and timberland prices, was produced by Jim Rinehart with R&A Investment Forestry.
The clear point is that there remains uncertainty in the market about discount rates and the direction of timberland values. My personal opinion is that we will not see big shifts in either direction in the short run but you had better pay attention to what is happening. Remember, timberland is not a very liquid investment as has been borne out by the limited transactions being reported.
If I have missed any sales, or have any errors, please send me an email at jbfiacco@gmail.com. As always, comments and differing opinions are appreciated (especially when supported by facts!). --Brian
Visit my web site at www.timberlandstrategies.com
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
A Matter of Perspective
Forestweb reported today on some new statistics from the UK Statistics Authority/Forestry Commission. The total area of woodland in the UK is 2.85 million hectares.
To put that in perspective, the total woodland area of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is roughly the same size as Plum Creek's timberland holdings in the U.S.
Think about that from the perspective of where the wood will come from in the future. --Brian
To put that in perspective, the total woodland area of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is roughly the same size as Plum Creek's timberland holdings in the U.S.
Think about that from the perspective of where the wood will come from in the future. --Brian
Thursday, February 4, 2010
THE FOREST INDUSTRY OF THE FUTURE: What Will It Look Like?
The following post was originally published by Timber-Mart South 4th Quarter 2009 -- Vol. 14, No. 4, January 2010
First, there has to be a basis for the prediction. The basis that I chose was to look at the changes occurring in the forest industry and to look at what I thought the future economic environment might look like.
The three key changes in progress are:
1. Changing Timberland Ownership
2. Biomass for Energy
3. Global Industrial Revolution
Timberland Ownership: The shift in ownership (from forest industry to institutional) is well documented and well underway so there is no need to spend time on it (maybe a couple of comments!). Due to the housing/lumber market collapse, timberland owned by the sawmill industry is following in the footsteps of that formerly owned by the pulp and paper industry. This is illustrated by the timberland ownership shifts of Allegheny Wood Products and Anthony Forest Products to TIMOs. Survival can be tough. The second point is that the institutional owners have no allegiance to a mill so the wood will flow to the highest bidder.
Biomass for Energy: This is not a new thing but its impact is changing and the magnitude of the issue is not universally well understood so it merits significant discussion. There are three drivers pushing the biomass market shift.
So where will this biomass come from? The primary sources of woody biomass are manufacturing residues, harvest residues, urban waste (construction, etc.), pulpwood and short rotation crops grown specifically for biomass. I have looked at available manufacturing residues for multiple clients and there is just not a significant amount available. It is virtually ALL being used and most of it is used by the forest industry to produce products or energy. Harvest residues are there BUT, as the pulp and paper industry knows, harvesting residues is expensive, they have a negative impact on mill processing and they produce a product of inferior quality and value. These traits are equally true for pellets and pulp. I don’t know much about urban waste but there is less of it with the housing market decline. So that leaves pulpwood and that is where the bulk of the woody biomass resource will come from.
To better understand the magnitude of potential biomass demand, let’s look at some of the new facilities.
A Pellet Mill: The pellet mill in Cottondale, Florida started up in April 2008 as the largest pellet production facility in the world. One hundred percent of the plant’s production is for export to Europe where the pellets are mixed with coal to reduce carbon emissions in the production of electricity. The driver behind it is the European carbon tax applicable to coal but not the carbon neutral wood pellet. The plant produces 560,000 tons of pellets annually and consumes about 1,000,000 green tons of wood. The resource used is not “residue” - it is pulpwood. This facility is the equivalent of a new pulp mill.
Cogeneration: This is certainly not new in the forest industry as our pulp mills have been doing this for a long time. What is new is the magnitude of the projects. Industry is expanding the use of cogeneration, schools are installing the systems and one village in Pennsylvania is building a system to use the steam to heat all of the houses in the village as well as supplying the electricity to them. An industrial example is the Sonoco / Peregrine Energy Corporation plan to develop a new $135 million woody biomass-fueled cogeneration plant in South Carolina. Plans are for Peregrine to construct a new 50-megawatt capacity facility that will be capable of generating enough electricity to power approximately 14,000 homes. The new biomass-fueled cogeneration facility will replace Sonoco's existing coal-fired boilers. Peregrine intends to sell the entire electrical output and all renewable energy certificates associated with the plant to Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and low pressure steam from the plant to Sonoco for use in the manufacture of recycled paperboard and other converted products. “The project would benefit the regions' forestry industry by utilizing pre-commercial thinnings and waste logging residues as the woody biomass fuel for the project.”
As a rule of thumb, a 100-megawatt plant will consume about a million green tons so this facility will consume about one-half of that but that is still a lot of precommercial thinnings!
A Coal Fired Power Plant: This one really caught my attention. The power companies are struggling with the renewable energy standards. In the East, there is limited opportunity for wind, solar or geothermal so biomass is about the only alternative left (hydro is out for a multitude of reasons). FirstEnergy at Shadyside, Ohio has announced its conversion from coal to biomass. The largest proposed development to date had been Yellow Pine Energy's 110 MW project in GA, a million-plus ton/year wood consumer. FirstEnergy’s is 312 MW and will consume 3 million green tons! This is on a par with the South’s largest pulp and paper mills.
The sheer quantity and magnitude of the announced facilities similar to the examples above is staggering from a resource consumption viewpoint. Not all of them will come to pass but it is very clear that enough of them will reach production levels that will greatly impact the future supply/demand picture for forest products.
Global Industrial Revolution: The third key change, the global industrial revolution, is well under way but it may never be realized. All of the developing nations have ambitions to reach the standard of living with which we are blessed but the commodities, the natural resources, are just not there to reach that level on a global basis. Commodity shortages, particularly oil and other transportation energy sources, will prevent the world from reaching the level that we have obtained and, more than likely, those same shortages will prevent us from maintaining that level. Escalating transportation costs will cause us to revert back to a society much more dependent on manufacturing. It is significantly less expensive to ship dried lumber than logs.
The three key changes mentioned above combine with a couple of additional economic factors to create the drivers that define my view of our economic future. The drivers are:
The Future of the Pulp Mill: Domestic paper demand will continue its downward trend but I am not as pessimistic about the industry’s future as most people are. The continuing decline in the dollar, although very bad for the consumer, will have a positive impact on the pulp and paper industry. The export market will be much brighter. A great deal of capacity has already been taken out of the market. Although bio-refinery economics are very unclear at this time, more capacity may come out as some mills are converted from pulp to production of “of ultra-clean, renewable motor fuels”. As the energy transportation costs rise, it may be cheaper to burn pulpwood for energy and to convert black liquor to transportation fuels. The key driver is the future price of oil and that may be considerably higher than the current consensus. The major downside for the pulp and paper industry will be the competitive demand for wood. Wood is both its raw material and its energy source and the power companies are going to be very tough competitors.
The Future of Sawmills: Despite the doom and gloom about future housing, domestic lumber demand driven by housing demographics still looks good after the excesses have been worked off. The Global Industrial Revolution combined with a weaker dollar will create a very positive manufacturing and exporting environment for sawmills. Global housing and lumber demand will be high and the U.S. will be one of the key suppliers. Very high energy costs make it more cost effective to ship lumber than logs to export markets, reversing the current norm. There will be a much more competitive market (higher prices) for mill residues. Consistent and steady demand from biomass consumers will provide a steady supply of logs from producers. Things couldn’t look much better assuming there is a mill somewhere that survives the current crisis! It’s always darkest before the dawn.
The Future of Biomass Consumption: Biomass utilization is a game changer in the forest industry because of the sheer quantity of biomass that will be utilized. Many schools in cold climates are heating with wood chip boilers today and they are saving money without any subsidies (and this is spreading to the warmer South as well). European villages have moved in that direction and some Canadian and U. S. villages are capitalizing on their experiences. The developing demand by the power companies seems so huge as to be unsustainable. Transportation cost increases will work against the large biomass programs such as the 3 million G ton Ohio facility. Power facilities with less output and shorter haul distances will be more cost effective (diseconomies of scale). If the “man-caused” global warming issue does not result in tax legislation, if consumers scream too loudly about electrical cost increases, government may back off and the power companies will be able to revert to coal to produce electricity more economically. That would take the pressure off biomass and still provide energy self-sufficiency to a degree. But even that scenario will not change the shift to biomass for energy. Oil is a finite resource and more energy must be expended to get each additional barrel. Like it or not, oil prices are on the wrong end of the power curve and that means that transportation costs are too. There WILL come a point, I don’t know when, where cellulosic ethanol (or one of the other wood-based transportation fuels) is less expensive than oil. When that happens, the forest industry is changed forever.
The Future in the Forest: Recent economic drivers supporting longer rotations are creating a “wall of wood” in the sawlog size class. Institutional investors have lengthened rotations from the pulpwood size-class to the sawtimber size-class to capitalize on the price differential. Sawtimber sales have been deferred as a result of poor markets, so harvest followed by planting has slowed (Figure 2).
The graph shows a significant decline in planting, which is troubling to some folks, but more likely reflects increased thinnings and significant reductions in clearcutting. Short rotation energy plantations close to market will happen IF wood costs go up significantly OR planners fail to anticipate increases in transportation costs. There will be more “in-woods” operations (chippers, biomass harvesting, biochar, and perhaps mobile methanol) – all driven by higher oil costs. Biomass harvests will be incorporated into conventional tree planting prescriptions. Much more competitive markets will mean higher stumpage prices for biomass and pulpwood. The current growth/drain ratios are very favorable (Figure 3) but sustainability will probably become a political issue if not a real one.
Changes in Wood Supply Chain: It is the same basic Wood Supply Chain, but…
So that’s the way I see it. A global economy responding to a failed energy policy built on unsustainable oil production. This view of the future may not be right but it is worth considering as you go forward.
Visit Timberland Strategies web site.
*****************************
I was recently asked to speak at the North Carolina Forestry Association’s annual meeting in Myrtle Beach on the above captioned topic. Before agreeing to the talk, I had to think about it for a while. The quote “Its tough to make predictions, especially about the future” attributed to Yogi Berra, as most quotes are, hung in my mind for a few days. But I took a shot at it and later agreed to share some of those thoughts with TMS readers. First, there has to be a basis for the prediction. The basis that I chose was to look at the changes occurring in the forest industry and to look at what I thought the future economic environment might look like.
The three key changes in progress are:
1. Changing Timberland Ownership
2. Biomass for Energy
3. Global Industrial Revolution
Timberland Ownership: The shift in ownership (from forest industry to institutional) is well documented and well underway so there is no need to spend time on it (maybe a couple of comments!). Due to the housing/lumber market collapse, timberland owned by the sawmill industry is following in the footsteps of that formerly owned by the pulp and paper industry. This is illustrated by the timberland ownership shifts of Allegheny Wood Products and Anthony Forest Products to TIMOs. Survival can be tough. The second point is that the institutional owners have no allegiance to a mill so the wood will flow to the highest bidder.
Biomass for Energy: This is not a new thing but its impact is changing and the magnitude of the issue is not universally well understood so it merits significant discussion. There are three drivers pushing the biomass market shift.
- Renewable Energy: The desire to shift to energy sources that we cannot “run out” of. Many states already have legislated renewable energy targets and biomass, particularly in the Southern states, is playing a key role toward the advancement of those goals.
- Climate Change: The desire to shift away from energy sources that add to the perceived problem of man caused global warming. Burning wood is carbon neutral when viewed from a carbon cycle perspective. This appears to be more of a political issue than a scientific one but that is irrelevant to the outcome. Pellet exports from the U.S. to Europe increased over ten fold last year fueled by carbon taxes in EU countries. If Cap and Trade is passed here, expect to see an even greater shift from coal to biomass by utilities.
- Energy self-sufficiency: This is the most important concern from my perspective. It is significant from both national defense and economic security points-of-view.
So where will this biomass come from? The primary sources of woody biomass are manufacturing residues, harvest residues, urban waste (construction, etc.), pulpwood and short rotation crops grown specifically for biomass. I have looked at available manufacturing residues for multiple clients and there is just not a significant amount available. It is virtually ALL being used and most of it is used by the forest industry to produce products or energy. Harvest residues are there BUT, as the pulp and paper industry knows, harvesting residues is expensive, they have a negative impact on mill processing and they produce a product of inferior quality and value. These traits are equally true for pellets and pulp. I don’t know much about urban waste but there is less of it with the housing market decline. So that leaves pulpwood and that is where the bulk of the woody biomass resource will come from.
To better understand the magnitude of potential biomass demand, let’s look at some of the new facilities.
A Pellet Mill: The pellet mill in Cottondale, Florida started up in April 2008 as the largest pellet production facility in the world. One hundred percent of the plant’s production is for export to Europe where the pellets are mixed with coal to reduce carbon emissions in the production of electricity. The driver behind it is the European carbon tax applicable to coal but not the carbon neutral wood pellet. The plant produces 560,000 tons of pellets annually and consumes about 1,000,000 green tons of wood. The resource used is not “residue” - it is pulpwood. This facility is the equivalent of a new pulp mill.
Cogeneration: This is certainly not new in the forest industry as our pulp mills have been doing this for a long time. What is new is the magnitude of the projects. Industry is expanding the use of cogeneration, schools are installing the systems and one village in Pennsylvania is building a system to use the steam to heat all of the houses in the village as well as supplying the electricity to them. An industrial example is the Sonoco / Peregrine Energy Corporation plan to develop a new $135 million woody biomass-fueled cogeneration plant in South Carolina. Plans are for Peregrine to construct a new 50-megawatt capacity facility that will be capable of generating enough electricity to power approximately 14,000 homes. The new biomass-fueled cogeneration facility will replace Sonoco's existing coal-fired boilers. Peregrine intends to sell the entire electrical output and all renewable energy certificates associated with the plant to Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and low pressure steam from the plant to Sonoco for use in the manufacture of recycled paperboard and other converted products. “The project would benefit the regions' forestry industry by utilizing pre-commercial thinnings and waste logging residues as the woody biomass fuel for the project.”
As a rule of thumb, a 100-megawatt plant will consume about a million green tons so this facility will consume about one-half of that but that is still a lot of precommercial thinnings!
A Coal Fired Power Plant: This one really caught my attention. The power companies are struggling with the renewable energy standards. In the East, there is limited opportunity for wind, solar or geothermal so biomass is about the only alternative left (hydro is out for a multitude of reasons). FirstEnergy at Shadyside, Ohio has announced its conversion from coal to biomass. The largest proposed development to date had been Yellow Pine Energy's 110 MW project in GA, a million-plus ton/year wood consumer. FirstEnergy’s is 312 MW and will consume 3 million green tons! This is on a par with the South’s largest pulp and paper mills.
The sheer quantity and magnitude of the announced facilities similar to the examples above is staggering from a resource consumption viewpoint. Not all of them will come to pass but it is very clear that enough of them will reach production levels that will greatly impact the future supply/demand picture for forest products.
Global Industrial Revolution: The third key change, the global industrial revolution, is well under way but it may never be realized. All of the developing nations have ambitions to reach the standard of living with which we are blessed but the commodities, the natural resources, are just not there to reach that level on a global basis. Commodity shortages, particularly oil and other transportation energy sources, will prevent the world from reaching the level that we have obtained and, more than likely, those same shortages will prevent us from maintaining that level. Escalating transportation costs will cause us to revert back to a society much more dependent on manufacturing. It is significantly less expensive to ship dried lumber than logs.
The three key changes mentioned above combine with a couple of additional economic factors to create the drivers that define my view of our economic future. The drivers are:
- Social drive for renewable energy, energy self-sufficiency and climate change
- High energy costs- The key cost escalator
- High Inflation Rate (perhaps hyperinflation) driven by:
* Very high government spending
* Very high oil prices
* Commodity shortages, including timber - Declining Value of Dollar (see Figure 1)
Source: fxstreet.com
The Future of the Pulp Mill: Domestic paper demand will continue its downward trend but I am not as pessimistic about the industry’s future as most people are. The continuing decline in the dollar, although very bad for the consumer, will have a positive impact on the pulp and paper industry. The export market will be much brighter. A great deal of capacity has already been taken out of the market. Although bio-refinery economics are very unclear at this time, more capacity may come out as some mills are converted from pulp to production of “of ultra-clean, renewable motor fuels”. As the energy transportation costs rise, it may be cheaper to burn pulpwood for energy and to convert black liquor to transportation fuels. The key driver is the future price of oil and that may be considerably higher than the current consensus. The major downside for the pulp and paper industry will be the competitive demand for wood. Wood is both its raw material and its energy source and the power companies are going to be very tough competitors.
The Future of Sawmills: Despite the doom and gloom about future housing, domestic lumber demand driven by housing demographics still looks good after the excesses have been worked off. The Global Industrial Revolution combined with a weaker dollar will create a very positive manufacturing and exporting environment for sawmills. Global housing and lumber demand will be high and the U.S. will be one of the key suppliers. Very high energy costs make it more cost effective to ship lumber than logs to export markets, reversing the current norm. There will be a much more competitive market (higher prices) for mill residues. Consistent and steady demand from biomass consumers will provide a steady supply of logs from producers. Things couldn’t look much better assuming there is a mill somewhere that survives the current crisis! It’s always darkest before the dawn.
The Future of Biomass Consumption: Biomass utilization is a game changer in the forest industry because of the sheer quantity of biomass that will be utilized. Many schools in cold climates are heating with wood chip boilers today and they are saving money without any subsidies (and this is spreading to the warmer South as well). European villages have moved in that direction and some Canadian and U. S. villages are capitalizing on their experiences. The developing demand by the power companies seems so huge as to be unsustainable. Transportation cost increases will work against the large biomass programs such as the 3 million G ton Ohio facility. Power facilities with less output and shorter haul distances will be more cost effective (diseconomies of scale). If the “man-caused” global warming issue does not result in tax legislation, if consumers scream too loudly about electrical cost increases, government may back off and the power companies will be able to revert to coal to produce electricity more economically. That would take the pressure off biomass and still provide energy self-sufficiency to a degree. But even that scenario will not change the shift to biomass for energy. Oil is a finite resource and more energy must be expended to get each additional barrel. Like it or not, oil prices are on the wrong end of the power curve and that means that transportation costs are too. There WILL come a point, I don’t know when, where cellulosic ethanol (or one of the other wood-based transportation fuels) is less expensive than oil. When that happens, the forest industry is changed forever.
The Future in the Forest: Recent economic drivers supporting longer rotations are creating a “wall of wood” in the sawlog size class. Institutional investors have lengthened rotations from the pulpwood size-class to the sawtimber size-class to capitalize on the price differential. Sawtimber sales have been deferred as a result of poor markets, so harvest followed by planting has slowed (Figure 2).
The graph shows a significant decline in planting, which is troubling to some folks, but more likely reflects increased thinnings and significant reductions in clearcutting. Short rotation energy plantations close to market will happen IF wood costs go up significantly OR planners fail to anticipate increases in transportation costs. There will be more “in-woods” operations (chippers, biomass harvesting, biochar, and perhaps mobile methanol) – all driven by higher oil costs. Biomass harvests will be incorporated into conventional tree planting prescriptions. Much more competitive markets will mean higher stumpage prices for biomass and pulpwood. The current growth/drain ratios are very favorable (Figure 3) but sustainability will probably become a political issue if not a real one.
Changes in Wood Supply Chain: It is the same basic Wood Supply Chain, but…
- Harvest residues will be added, probably more mechanized
- Biomass demand brings more stable wood demand
- No monthly (weekly, daily) shifts in mill consumption
- No shifts in species needed
- Annual contracts for wood producers become practical for biomass production – good news for loggers!
- May force the same for pulpwood and sawlog buyers
- Logging will become a more robust, stable and competitive market segment
- Biomass/Power companies will be a key part of the industry.
- There will be more “in-woods” operations (chippers, biomass harvesting, biochar, and perhaps mobile methanol).
- A smaller pulp and paper industry will survive and exporting will play a larger role.
- Sawmills: Demographics still favor housing and lumber export market will become significant. Imports less competitive.
- Logging contractors will have a more stable operating environment. Annual production contracts.
- Stumpage market will be more competitive and more stable.
- Plantation establishment will consider energy market.
- Timberland ownership will be a good place to be!
So that’s the way I see it. A global economy responding to a failed energy policy built on unsustainable oil production. This view of the future may not be right but it is worth considering as you go forward.
*****
Differing views welcome, especially if rational is explained. --BrianVisit Timberland Strategies web site.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Anthony Forest Products Sells 93,360 Acres
The pressure from low product demand and low selling prices continues to hammer the sawmills. Companies that have been long-term owners and managers of timberland are continuing to be forced to liquidate landholdings to stay in business. Anthony Forest Products is the most recent with the sale of 93,360 acres of conservatively managed timberland in Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana being sold to a client of the Molpus Woodlands Group for $173,150,000 or $1,895 per acre. There is a wood supply agreement between Anthony and the new owner as a part of the sale agreement.
The Molpus Woodlands Group continues to build itself into a stronger and well diversified TIMO (850,000 acres in 11 states). Read the entire news release here.
The Molpus Woodlands Group continues to build itself into a stronger and well diversified TIMO (850,000 acres in 11 states). Read the entire news release here.
Sunday, March 15, 2009
The Dichotomy in Timberland Valuation
The issue in today’s post concerns why the transaction price of timberland has shown little or no decline in value but the stock price of the publicly traded companies that own timberland has declined dramatically. I will also look at what I think is happening in the timberland market today and how I see the market for timberland investment. But first, let’s set the stage.
In January, I did a post that included some graphs developed from my timberland transaction file. I was looking to see if the data supported a wide-spread belief that timberland values had dropped. The thinking was that housing starts declined, which caused a drop in lumber prices, which caused a drop in stumpage prices (all true), which caused a drop in timberland prices. You can read that post here How Much Did Timberland Values Fall in 2008? The data did not support the logic and did not show any evidence of a significant decline in timberland values. (For those that sent emails saying my opinion was wrong – that was not my opinion, it was just the data). I also wondered what the NCREIF Timberland Index would look like when it was released. The publicly accessible portion of the NCREIF website showed quarterly returns that compound to a 9.5% total return for the timberland in its index in 2008 but the components of the return are not broken out. A recent report by Brookfield Timberlands Management, distributed by Forestweb, shows the NCREIF return broken down by earnings and capital appreciation.
NCREIF TIMBERLAND INDEX
The significant decline in the blue portion of the graph reflects the decline in housing/lumber/stumpage/earnings. The green portion, Capital Appreciation, can be viewed somewhat (not perfect) as a surrogate of the change in timberland value as determined from tract sales and appraisals of tracts – all of which are a part of the index. Note the green from 2000 to 2002. This data certainly contains no indication of a 2008 decline in the price of timberland either.
Below is another graph that I found interesting. It is from the Timberland Report VOL. 10, NO. 2; by the James W. Sewall Company, a highly respected firm with a very long record in the timberland investment community.
From my perspective, the important take-a-way from this graph is that the old correlation between timberland values and housing starts fell apart. We can speculate as to why and we can speculate as to whether the correlation will return but it’s pretty clear that the conventional wisdom has not prevailed during this economic downturn. Another graph in the report reinforces the historical correlations between housing starts and stumpage prices. That correlation did hold as all timber owners know only too well. You can read the entire Sewall report here(recommended).
Now, let’s take a look at the price of common stock in some of the publicly traded companies that have timberland holdings that represent a significant share of the companies’ assets and see how share prices were impacted last year. Ownership structures of these companies include timber REITs, “C” corporations and limited partnerships but for my purposes today, I will refer to them collectively as “timberland companies”. Let’s look at this chart I made from Google.
It’s hard to see but the blue line just above Weyerhaeuser (green line) is the S&P 500. Weyerhaeuser took an early hit because it has such a major direct investment in housing. I read somewhere that it is the 17th largest home builder. The rest of the timber companies fell about the same amount as, and in synch with, the general market. My conclusion is that the timber companies stock price tracks the stock market rather than with the timberland market. Not a “pure play” in the bunch. Down about 50% when timberland prices held pretty steady.
I have long been a skeptic of the “pure play” concept of acquiring timberland companies (or an ETF) as a surrogate for timberland ownership. Even if 100% of the assets owned by the company were timberland, I would still be a skeptic and here is why.
Timberland investors use metrics based on a time horizon of 10 to 50 or more years. The key metrics are based on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses over that time horizon. If you would like to read more about timber valuation than you really want to know, you can do that here. The metrics used by those that analyze stock value are usually based on very short term future cash flows of a year or two (no need to discount those!). The inherent assumption is that the stock price will respond to very short term (a few quarters or few years at most) cash flows and that the stock will be bought or sold in that time frame. Some of the most referenced metrics are based on what happened last year rather than what is expected to happen in the future (current P/E for example). The Warren Buffets in the crowd that actually do take a long term view of stock investing are a clear minority today and I’m sure that DCF is an integral part of their valuation. Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not saying that one way is right and that the other way is wrong, only that they produce different results and that creates a dichotomy in value and an opportunity for long term investors. Given all this, is it any wonder that the stock of the timberland companies has fallen dramatically with the general market decline? The value of their timberland portfolio is based upon the very depressed earnings reflecting current stumpage prices rather than the DCF of future stumpage prices!
At this point, I reach two conclusions (and I know that some will not agree)
I have long been a skeptic of the “pure play” concept of acquiring timberland companies (or an ETF) as a surrogate for timberland ownership. Even if 100% of the assets owned by the company were timberland, I would still be a skeptic and here is why.
Timberland investors use metrics based on a time horizon of 10 to 50 or more years. The key metrics are based on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses over that time horizon. If you would like to read more about timber valuation than you really want to know, you can do that here. The metrics used by those that analyze stock value are usually based on very short term future cash flows of a year or two (no need to discount those!). The inherent assumption is that the stock price will respond to very short term (a few quarters or few years at most) cash flows and that the stock will be bought or sold in that time frame. Some of the most referenced metrics are based on what happened last year rather than what is expected to happen in the future (current P/E for example). The Warren Buffets in the crowd that actually do take a long term view of stock investing are a clear minority today and I’m sure that DCF is an integral part of their valuation. Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not saying that one way is right and that the other way is wrong, only that they produce different results and that creates a dichotomy in value and an opportunity for long term investors. Given all this, is it any wonder that the stock of the timberland companies has fallen dramatically with the general market decline? The value of their timberland portfolio is based upon the very depressed earnings reflecting current stumpage prices rather than the DCF of future stumpage prices!
At this point, I reach two conclusions (and I know that some will not agree)
- Timberland values have fallen little if any, and
- The timberland value component of the timberland companies’ stock price has fallen dramatically
And therein is the opportunity.
Here is another stock chart just like the one above except Forestar Group has been added. If ever there was a pure play for timberland/HBU, this is it. Other than some OGM, that is its only asset!
The “Pure Play” Fallacy
In spite of that, the stock price of Forestar dropped over 80% - the worst of the group. So much for the “pure play” concept. If you want to invest in timberland, you need to own timberland, not stock!
Think about this. Is it possible that the assets of Forestar were worth five times as much in June as they were in November? Some folks sure didn’t think so. To name a couple, Holland Ware and Carl Icahn. Both recognize the dichotomy in valuation methodology between timberland and the valuation of the stock in timberland companies! Both made some serious money with that little bit of information and a lot of cash. Buy at $3 - $4/share, offer $15.00 (still undervalued), sell at $12 or so. Not bad. And the $15/share offer? Even that was well under the underlying value of the timberland/HBU asset.
Okay. We understand what happened in 2008. What is happening to timberland prices now and what will happen in the future? I still have seen no significant decline in transaction prices regardless of the emails I get claiming dramatic declines in prices (no transaction details attached). There is a slowing of transactions, at least one announced major transaction (St. Joe) did not close and several tracts that were put on the market were pulled off. What does this mean for the future?
It may mean that prices will fall. It may mean that buyers are holding their cash until this economic downturn, recession, depression, or crisis begins to resolve itself. I don’t know what the future holds but I do know that there is a lot of pension fund and other cash out there that will be invested somewhere. Today it is going into money market accounts and just kind of sitting there. Barron’s reported about a week ago that there was $4 trillion in money market funds which is about one-half the market cap of the entire U. S. stock market. That is a lot of money and I doubt that it will all stay in cash. At some point, some will go back into the market, some to commodities, some elsewhere and some to timberland.
Long term, I remain bullish on timberland but, in the short-term, I think that stock in the timberland companies is a better investment. The downside is less than timberland and the upside is much, much greater. If you follow Holland Ware, you won’t starve. --Brian
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Visit my website at Timberland Strategies
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Monday, March 9, 2009
Valuing Timberland V – The Discount Rate
This is the fifth and final post of a series on timberland valuation. If you missed the first post, which included an Overview plus a discussion on Disaggregation, you can read “Valuing Timberland I” here. The second post focused primarily on productivity and how that fits into today’s appraisal systems which use discounted cash flow techniques to determine the value of timberland. You can read “Valuing Timberland II” here. The third post focused on estimates of timber volumes and values, how we get them, and how to forecast them for future year’s cash flows. Read “Valuing Timberland III” here. The subject of the last post, Valuing Timberland IV, was on the methodologies used in discounted cash flow analysis. Today I’ll focus on the discount rate to be used in the cash flow model.
The “discount rate” is essentially the same thing as the interest rate used in any financial calculation. We have to get the series of future cash flows “discounted” back to the present so we pick the appropriate interest rate to do that. As an example, say you wanted to buy a tract of land and your credit union would lend you the money for 6%. You know there is some risk associated with this so you assign another 2% for risk. You would use a discount rate of 8%. Sounds simple to me.
Let me start off by saying “I don’t know what discount rate to use”! This question is argued by investors, economists and corporate finance types. But understand this, selection of the discount rate is the most important decision made during the valuation process. Let me illustrate.
Many years ago (I was working as a Land Acquisition Forester at the time) I decided to reread Thoreau’s “Walden” which led me to “In the Maine Woods”, “A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers” and “Cape Cod”. Considering my job, Thoreau really got my attention with the following words from “Cape Cod”.
“Between the Pond and East Harbor Village there was an interesting plantation of pitch-pines, twenty or thirty acres in extent, like those which we had already seen from the stage. One who lived near said that the land was purchased by two men for a shilling or twenty-five cents an acre. Some is not considered worth writing a deed for.”
Thoreau had traveled across the Cape in the 1850’s and I had noticed and made mental note of these same pitch pine plantations while visiting there. So what would a Land Acquisition Forester think… “Man, what a buy that would have been!”
What if an investor knew what the values on the Cape would be like in 2008? Would he have bought some of that timberland for $0.25 acre? Maybe, maybe not. Let’s consider the opportunity and create a simple analysis. Let’s say that the investor could foresee all that wonderful HBU land on the Cape and actually KNEW what 2009 land prices would be like. Keeping it simple (so we can isolate the impact of discount rate selection), assume he leased the land out “for taxes” so he had no cash flows (positive or negative) other than the purchase and sale of the land. The data below shows the value of a $0.25/acre investment compounded forward for 150 years.
So…, would the investor have bought the land (for his descendents!!). It very clearly depends on the discount rate that the investor used. I don’t think that there is an acre of scraggly pine plantation on the Cape that could be bought for $1,562/acre and I doubt that you could sell an acre for over $300 million per acre either – not even the Kennedy compound. The value determined clearly depends on the discount rate used. So what discount rate would you have used? Think about that seriously. If the rate is too high (nice to get but will you get it!) you may never have the opportunity to make an investment EXCEPT one that is very risky.
When I was in forestry school (back in the 60’s) we normally used 6% in our forest economics courses. When I was an MBA student (in the late 70’s), we used the company’s marginal cost of capital with an appropriate adjustment for risk. Early in the timberland shift to TIMOs, it was pretty freely discussed that TIMOs were using real rates in the 6% to 8% which was based on the “risk free” rate of return (10 year T-bills at 4%) plus risk adjustment. At the same time, integrated forest products companies with large timberland acreages were using investment hurdle rates significantly above the average or even marginal cost of capital for the firm (a mistake – it should have been based on the marginal cost of capital and risk associated with purchasing and owning more timberland not riskier investments!). The result of this is that high-risk capital investments were subsidized by low-risk timberland ownership. As a general rule, discount rates used by the C corporations were much higher than that used by the TIMOs (rates in the range of 12% - 15% or more). Remember the decision you reached above with the Thoreau example. The C corporations also had to include taxes in the cash flow analyses (reducing cash flow and, subsequently, value) whereas most of the TIMO clients were pension funds and tax exempt. Between the tax payments and high discount rates used by the corporations, it is pretty clear why the TIMOs valued timberland higher than the forest industry.
Note two things from the above discussion. The “appraised value” of a particular tract of timberland, based on comparable sales, was the same for the TIMO buyer and the forest industry seller yet the real valuation for the buyer and seller were very different. As I pointed out in an earlier post; timberland valuation and fair market value are two different things!! The second point: the difference in discount rates used, combined with tax policy, has dramatically changed the face of timberland ownership and forestry practice in this country.
How do inflation and taxes affect the selection of the discount rate? We discussed that somewhat in the post on cash flows. Here are a couple of quotes, also from the Forest Landowners Guide to the Federal Income Tax, Ag. Handbook No. 718.
“it is imperative that the discount (interest) rate used for the analysis include a similar expectation factor for inflation. In summary, both elements of the analysis—cash flow and discount rate—must be kept in comparable terms (with or without inflation and before or after-tax) for reliable results.”
“Forestry investments are very sensitive to the discount rate used because of the long time period between planting and harvest. For after-tax analyses, the correct discount rate is the after-tax rate based on your alternative rate of return. If the next best alternative is a tax-free investment, such as a municipal bond, then the interest rate is used without adjustment, as shown in Table 2-3 for the 10-percent discount rate. If your next best alternative is an investment, such as a corporate bond, that yields 10 percent annually with taxes subtracted before compounding, the correct discount rate is 7.2 percent, after-tax [10 percent x (1 - 0.28 assumed tax rate)]. Alternatively, if the next best alternative is an investment such as an individual retirement account (IRA), certain saving bonds, or an alternative timber investment, where taxes are deferred until the end of the period rather than being subtracted before compounding, then the correct discount rate depends on the length of the investment period and when the costs are incurred and revenues received. Assuming an initial investment, 10 percent interest, and a 28-percent tax subtracted at the end of 34 years, the appropriate discount rate would be 8.94 percent.
Now, if you feel that you still need more info on how to select the right discount rate for a timberland purchase, let me give you a couple more references.
The “discount rate” is essentially the same thing as the interest rate used in any financial calculation. We have to get the series of future cash flows “discounted” back to the present so we pick the appropriate interest rate to do that. As an example, say you wanted to buy a tract of land and your credit union would lend you the money for 6%. You know there is some risk associated with this so you assign another 2% for risk. You would use a discount rate of 8%. Sounds simple to me.
Let me start off by saying “I don’t know what discount rate to use”! This question is argued by investors, economists and corporate finance types. But understand this, selection of the discount rate is the most important decision made during the valuation process. Let me illustrate.
Many years ago (I was working as a Land Acquisition Forester at the time) I decided to reread Thoreau’s “Walden” which led me to “In the Maine Woods”, “A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers” and “Cape Cod”. Considering my job, Thoreau really got my attention with the following words from “Cape Cod”.
“Between the Pond and East Harbor Village there was an interesting plantation of pitch-pines, twenty or thirty acres in extent, like those which we had already seen from the stage. One who lived near said that the land was purchased by two men for a shilling or twenty-five cents an acre. Some is not considered worth writing a deed for.”
Thoreau had traveled across the Cape in the 1850’s and I had noticed and made mental note of these same pitch pine plantations while visiting there. So what would a Land Acquisition Forester think… “Man, what a buy that would have been!”
What if an investor knew what the values on the Cape would be like in 2008? Would he have bought some of that timberland for $0.25 acre? Maybe, maybe not. Let’s consider the opportunity and create a simple analysis. Let’s say that the investor could foresee all that wonderful HBU land on the Cape and actually KNEW what 2009 land prices would be like. Keeping it simple (so we can isolate the impact of discount rate selection), assume he leased the land out “for taxes” so he had no cash flows (positive or negative) other than the purchase and sale of the land. The data below shows the value of a $0.25/acre investment compounded forward for 150 years.
So…, would the investor have bought the land (for his descendents!!). It very clearly depends on the discount rate that the investor used. I don’t think that there is an acre of scraggly pine plantation on the Cape that could be bought for $1,562/acre and I doubt that you could sell an acre for over $300 million per acre either – not even the Kennedy compound. The value determined clearly depends on the discount rate used. So what discount rate would you have used? Think about that seriously. If the rate is too high (nice to get but will you get it!) you may never have the opportunity to make an investment EXCEPT one that is very risky.
When I was in forestry school (back in the 60’s) we normally used 6% in our forest economics courses. When I was an MBA student (in the late 70’s), we used the company’s marginal cost of capital with an appropriate adjustment for risk. Early in the timberland shift to TIMOs, it was pretty freely discussed that TIMOs were using real rates in the 6% to 8% which was based on the “risk free” rate of return (10 year T-bills at 4%) plus risk adjustment. At the same time, integrated forest products companies with large timberland acreages were using investment hurdle rates significantly above the average or even marginal cost of capital for the firm (a mistake – it should have been based on the marginal cost of capital and risk associated with purchasing and owning more timberland not riskier investments!). The result of this is that high-risk capital investments were subsidized by low-risk timberland ownership. As a general rule, discount rates used by the C corporations were much higher than that used by the TIMOs (rates in the range of 12% - 15% or more). Remember the decision you reached above with the Thoreau example. The C corporations also had to include taxes in the cash flow analyses (reducing cash flow and, subsequently, value) whereas most of the TIMO clients were pension funds and tax exempt. Between the tax payments and high discount rates used by the corporations, it is pretty clear why the TIMOs valued timberland higher than the forest industry.
Note two things from the above discussion. The “appraised value” of a particular tract of timberland, based on comparable sales, was the same for the TIMO buyer and the forest industry seller yet the real valuation for the buyer and seller were very different. As I pointed out in an earlier post; timberland valuation and fair market value are two different things!! The second point: the difference in discount rates used, combined with tax policy, has dramatically changed the face of timberland ownership and forestry practice in this country.
How do inflation and taxes affect the selection of the discount rate? We discussed that somewhat in the post on cash flows. Here are a couple of quotes, also from the Forest Landowners Guide to the Federal Income Tax, Ag. Handbook No. 718.
“it is imperative that the discount (interest) rate used for the analysis include a similar expectation factor for inflation. In summary, both elements of the analysis—cash flow and discount rate—must be kept in comparable terms (with or without inflation and before or after-tax) for reliable results.”
“Forestry investments are very sensitive to the discount rate used because of the long time period between planting and harvest. For after-tax analyses, the correct discount rate is the after-tax rate based on your alternative rate of return. If the next best alternative is a tax-free investment, such as a municipal bond, then the interest rate is used without adjustment, as shown in Table 2-3 for the 10-percent discount rate. If your next best alternative is an investment, such as a corporate bond, that yields 10 percent annually with taxes subtracted before compounding, the correct discount rate is 7.2 percent, after-tax [10 percent x (1 - 0.28 assumed tax rate)]. Alternatively, if the next best alternative is an investment such as an individual retirement account (IRA), certain saving bonds, or an alternative timber investment, where taxes are deferred until the end of the period rather than being subtracted before compounding, then the correct discount rate depends on the length of the investment period and when the costs are incurred and revenues received. Assuming an initial investment, 10 percent interest, and a 28-percent tax subtracted at the end of 34 years, the appropriate discount rate would be 8.94 percent.
Now, if you feel that you still need more info on how to select the right discount rate for a timberland purchase, let me give you a couple more references.
- “Timberland Investments” by Christian Zinkhan, et. al.
- “Discount Rates and Timberland Investments” by Brooks C Mendell in the Timberland Report published by James W. Sewall Company
Finally, it may be worthwhile to speculate a little bit (actually that is what the selection of the discount rate is). Timberland investors have watched as discount rates rose early in this decade followed by decreasing discount rates which resulted in a steady increase in timberland transaction prices (and corresponding values from comparable sale based appraisals). Some TIMOs have left the market so they clearly believe discount rates got too low and pushed prices too high (potential returns too low). Other TIMOs have tried to sell large blocks but pulled them off the market. Perhaps they think discount rates are too high but prices are too low to justify selling?? Or maybe there is less money chasing timberland. This concludes the Timberland Valuation series.
Oh, I almost forgot. Nobody is going to tell you what discount rate to use. That's your call. Comments welcome. --Brian
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Valuing Timberland III
This is the third post of a series on timberland valuation. If you missed the first post, which included an Overview plus a discussion on Disaggregation, you can read “Valuing Timberland I” here. The second post focused primarily on productivity and how that fits into today’s appraisal systems which use discounted cash flow techniques to determine the value of timberland. You can read “Valuing Timberland II” here. Today’s post will focus on estimates of timber volumes and values, how we get them, and how we forecast them for future year’s cash flows. We will also take a quick look at the confidence you should place in them.
First, let’s look at timber volumes. What does the cruise say? What does the inventory say? What is the difference? How was the acreage calculated? Are volume estimates tied to a GIS? What are the sources of errors? Can volumes be reasonably audited? If the volume estimate isn’t “right”, the value certainly won’t be!
What is a “cruise”? A survey of forestland to locate timber and estimate its quantity by species, products, size, quality, or other characteristics; the estimate in such a survey. Several different sampling techniques can be used in a cruise. (source: Forestry Terms for Mississippi Landowners, Mississippi State University Extension).
What is an “inventory”? See Cruise (same source). H’mmm. I don’t want to aggravate my Mississippi State colleagues or to argue semantics but there is a huge difference between a cruise and an inventory or, more appropriately, a timber cruise and a forest inventory. To keep it simple, the cruise (as correctly defined above) collects data to estimate the timber volume, quantity, etc. that is there right now. The forest inventory collects much more information which can be used to project volumes and harvests (and other stuff too) into the future. A cruise, as defined above, wouldn’t collect any information on an eight year old loblolly pine plantation. There is little or no volume (perhaps a few trees that meet the limits of merchantability) but there certainly is value. A forest inventory would want to know the species, age, trees/acre, site index and acreage at a minimum. That is the information that is necessary to drive the growth and yield models necessary to estimate future wood flows from the tract. The wood flows become the basis for the cash flows in the appraisal. Perhaps this is just semantics but it is very important to understand the difference and to know what you are looking at.
So the “acquisition cruise” necessary to purchase land is more appropriately referred to as a forest inventory than a cruise. A “timber cruise” is more likely used to determine the immediate value of the timber for a timber sale. Data to drive growth models or cash flow models is not necessary. This distinction is more than academic. The inventory data can be “grown” to provide volume information for appraisals, stand level info for thinning or harvest, projected harvest and regeneration sites for planning site preparation and planting, all at multiple forward points in time. A typical cruise is not designed to do this. Merchantability specs are frequently different between cruises and inventories resulting in differences in volumes reported. Merchantability specs for inventories must be consistent from tract to tract, year to year, cruiser to cruiser and they must be consistent with what the growth models require. Merchantability specs for a timber sale cruise will normally be modified to conform to current demand, market pricing and perhaps even the logger that will be doing the harvesting.
The lesson here is that the user of cruise or inventory information had better understand what he or she is looking at. The cruise/inventory designer needs a clear understanding of the objective of the cruise. Otherwise, expect disappointment.
The sampling intensity of most inventories will not provide adequate data for timber sales. Inventories must collect some information on every stand or stratum (a collection of stands with similar characteristics). The objective of an inventory or cruise is to gather the information that is necessary at an acceptable level of accuracy at the least possible cost. Contrasting the two extremes, consider the case of a 100,000 acre land acquisition compared to a 50 acre mature hardwood timber sale. The objective of the land acquisition inventory is to be accurate enough to generate a reasonably accurate cash flow analysis for the perceived life of the investment (and hence, its present value). Another objective may be to assist in management if the tract is purchased. The resulting inventory would be one with a low sampling intensity but one collecting much information at each sample plot. The inventory is “not accurate” at the stand level. Cost is a serious consideration. If the tract is not purchased, the entire cost of the inventory is wasted. The 50 acre timber sale, on the other hand, has a much higher sampling intensity (perhaps a 100% tally), does not require collecting growth modeling information and requires careful inspection of the quality of each tree relative to current market conditions. The cruise cost/acre is much higher but the payback is immediate and ensured.
Statistics 101: Reiterating an earlier point when addressing timber volume reports; you had better understand what you are looking at. Most well done cruise reports will provide some detail with respect to the statistical accuracy provided by the data. You will see something like “2,216 MBF ± 10% of hardwood sawtimber”. This means, that from a statistical standpoint, the actual volume will be within 10% of the volume estimate 95% of the time, or maybe 90% of the time, or maybe 66% of the time. Maybe you better ask which probability level applies! You will probably also see a volume by species report and perhaps that will also provide statistical error reporting too. If it doesn’t, you should understand that because the sampling intensity for any given species is well below that of all of the species combined, the accuracy of the estimate drops pretty dramatically in a mixed species stand or forest. Now, digging into the cruise report a little deeper you will see that volumes may be reported by species and diameter class. How accurate do you think that will be? If the statistics are reported, that is great. If not, beware the value that you place in the numbers. This information can be useful but you have to assign it the appropriate credibility.
You should also understand that there are other sources of error in a cruise in addition to the statistical sampling error. Examples are the use of incorrect volume tables, measurement errors, poor sample design, calculation errors and, yes, a poor cruiser.
The statistical accuracy of large inventories that have been conducted over several different years and have been brought current using growth models is a different story. I’m not going to get into how to do this because I have no earthly idea how to do it! It can be done by a fairly limited group of forest statisticians, mensurationists and biometricians but it is clearly a difficult task. As a rule of thumb, it is safe to say that the accuracy is somewhat less than what would be calculated using the “ungrown” plots and declines as the number of “grown” years increases.
That’s enough said about cruise reports, inventories and the timber volumes that they report. Now let’s talk about volumes that what will be there tomorrow and the fundamentals of creating a future wood flow.
Future harvest volumes and timing must be done on a stand by stand basis utilizing stand volumes that have been “grown” using yield tables and growth and yield models. The starting base is the stand or strata level inventory and each stand or stratum is grown into the future. Some rule or methodology is then used to select the harvest date to determine the harvest volume for each future year. The result is a wood flow model that, when combined with values, becomes a key component of the cash flow model. More detail about this will be provided in the next post.
This is probably the appropriate place to discuss the integration of a GIS (Geographic Information System) with the timber inventory system when creating the information system used for timberland management. GIS based inventory systems are very common among managers of large tracts of timberland today and sellers normally provide output from these systems to potential buyers. Inventory or cruise volumes may say what is out there but the GIS says exactly WHERE it is on the surface of the earth. A quick check of the validity of the data provided by the seller can be made by auditing selected stands to compare inventory acreage, stocking, volumes, forest types, SI, etc. to the audited values. It doesn’t take much of this type of checking to determine how serious the forest managers have been about the quality and timeliness of their inventory efforts and hence the credence that can be placed in the data provided. The GIS data can be “read” into the GIS based harvest scheduling/ cash flow models and will eventually provide the basis for future management (activity schedules, maps and annual cash flow projections). These are the tools that become the foundation for communications and expectations between the new landowner and the timberland managers. The schedules tell the owner what to expect financially and form the basis of the management plan for the manager. A final point about the GIS based inventory system is that it provides the basis for a field audit in conjunction with the traditional financial audit. In the timberland sector, a financial audit without a corresponding field audit is a serious mistake; in fact, it's not really an audit.
Now let’s discuss timber values. They are down! A lot! If you are selling timber today, that is very important but how important is it with respect to timberland valuation? Should current market conditions be used for valuation?
The comments below are by Rick Holley (from Plum Creek 2008 Q3 Earnings Conference call) answering an analyst’s question about why he thinks timberland values are holding up while other asset classes are declining in value. The quote is a little messed up but his point is clear.
“I think largely because the investor in timberlands, and there’s still a fair amount of capital on the sidelines trying to invest in timberlands, is longer term. They’re looking through this cycle. If anything they’re starting to look at this cycle and lower prices as being more upside when you look out a year or two years or whatever these markets improve. I know there was a recent [Reese] article talking about some transactions that may or may not get done. We’re in the marketplace and we talk to a lot of buyers. We know who the sellers are, and we think all those transactions will in fact get done at very, very good prices, so I think the market is holding up and there’s still a lot of capital chasing very little opportunity…”
The key words above are “looking through…” with respect to timberland prices. To me, that implies that they are also “looking through” with respect to the timber values used in the timberland valuation. I think that if stumpage prices were at all-time highs, buyers would “look through” and see lower prices in the future as well. As Andy Malmquist, my good friend, former employee, and current TIMO guy, used to remind me about so many things… “It’s regressing toward the mean”! Andy actually talks like that.
There are at least three factors to consider for determining future timber values to apply to future volumes – current values, real price increases and inflation. We will discuss how to address inflation in the next post so for now, we will confine the discussion to the first two items.
I am defining “current price” as a “look through” price that is on the trend line for the species,local area and region (huge differences between NE and NW, cherry and red maple). In other words, I am looking for the price that has “regressed to the mean”. This data can be obtained from several different pricing services such as Forest2Market, RISI and Timber-Mart South. In addition, most state forestry commissions (South Carolina Forestry Commission pricing report) or forestry university extension services also provide some level of pricing reports. Local consulting foresters usually know what is available and can also provide first hand local knowledge. Pricing from these sources will provide the baseline for projecting the value of future harvests in the cash flow model.
A real increase in future stumpage prices can and should be incorporated into the model if you think it is justified. U. S. Forest Service reports suggest that sawtimber stumpage prices have increased at a real rate of 2% a year over a very long period of time. An analysis of southern pine stumpage prices by forest economist Jack Lutz reached the following conclusion:
“Our analysis indicates that southern pine sawtimber stumpage prices are mean-reverting, with a 50-year mean of $38.29/ton (based on LDAF data). Those prices have held to that mean through 50 years of timber supply and demand shocks and significant changes in timber harvesting and processing technology. That means we should not expect a significant increase in sawtimber stumpage prices in the near future. This supports the current practice of many timberland investors who are using 0% real appreciation rates in their timberland investment models.”
The future is anybodies guess but the real value increase used should be based upon your view of the future. That’s why there is always a high bidder and a low bidder!
This concludes the discussion on timber volumes and values. The next post in the series will attempt to tie it all together by addressing the methodologies associated with the discounted cash flow models. Comments are welcomed. --Brian
First, let’s look at timber volumes. What does the cruise say? What does the inventory say? What is the difference? How was the acreage calculated? Are volume estimates tied to a GIS? What are the sources of errors? Can volumes be reasonably audited? If the volume estimate isn’t “right”, the value certainly won’t be!
What is a “cruise”? A survey of forestland to locate timber and estimate its quantity by species, products, size, quality, or other characteristics; the estimate in such a survey. Several different sampling techniques can be used in a cruise. (source: Forestry Terms for Mississippi Landowners, Mississippi State University Extension).
What is an “inventory”? See Cruise (same source). H’mmm. I don’t want to aggravate my Mississippi State colleagues or to argue semantics but there is a huge difference between a cruise and an inventory or, more appropriately, a timber cruise and a forest inventory. To keep it simple, the cruise (as correctly defined above) collects data to estimate the timber volume, quantity, etc. that is there right now. The forest inventory collects much more information which can be used to project volumes and harvests (and other stuff too) into the future. A cruise, as defined above, wouldn’t collect any information on an eight year old loblolly pine plantation. There is little or no volume (perhaps a few trees that meet the limits of merchantability) but there certainly is value. A forest inventory would want to know the species, age, trees/acre, site index and acreage at a minimum. That is the information that is necessary to drive the growth and yield models necessary to estimate future wood flows from the tract. The wood flows become the basis for the cash flows in the appraisal. Perhaps this is just semantics but it is very important to understand the difference and to know what you are looking at.
So the “acquisition cruise” necessary to purchase land is more appropriately referred to as a forest inventory than a cruise. A “timber cruise” is more likely used to determine the immediate value of the timber for a timber sale. Data to drive growth models or cash flow models is not necessary. This distinction is more than academic. The inventory data can be “grown” to provide volume information for appraisals, stand level info for thinning or harvest, projected harvest and regeneration sites for planning site preparation and planting, all at multiple forward points in time. A typical cruise is not designed to do this. Merchantability specs are frequently different between cruises and inventories resulting in differences in volumes reported. Merchantability specs for inventories must be consistent from tract to tract, year to year, cruiser to cruiser and they must be consistent with what the growth models require. Merchantability specs for a timber sale cruise will normally be modified to conform to current demand, market pricing and perhaps even the logger that will be doing the harvesting.
The lesson here is that the user of cruise or inventory information had better understand what he or she is looking at. The cruise/inventory designer needs a clear understanding of the objective of the cruise. Otherwise, expect disappointment.
The sampling intensity of most inventories will not provide adequate data for timber sales. Inventories must collect some information on every stand or stratum (a collection of stands with similar characteristics). The objective of an inventory or cruise is to gather the information that is necessary at an acceptable level of accuracy at the least possible cost. Contrasting the two extremes, consider the case of a 100,000 acre land acquisition compared to a 50 acre mature hardwood timber sale. The objective of the land acquisition inventory is to be accurate enough to generate a reasonably accurate cash flow analysis for the perceived life of the investment (and hence, its present value). Another objective may be to assist in management if the tract is purchased. The resulting inventory would be one with a low sampling intensity but one collecting much information at each sample plot. The inventory is “not accurate” at the stand level. Cost is a serious consideration. If the tract is not purchased, the entire cost of the inventory is wasted. The 50 acre timber sale, on the other hand, has a much higher sampling intensity (perhaps a 100% tally), does not require collecting growth modeling information and requires careful inspection of the quality of each tree relative to current market conditions. The cruise cost/acre is much higher but the payback is immediate and ensured.
Statistics 101: Reiterating an earlier point when addressing timber volume reports; you had better understand what you are looking at. Most well done cruise reports will provide some detail with respect to the statistical accuracy provided by the data. You will see something like “2,216 MBF ± 10% of hardwood sawtimber”. This means, that from a statistical standpoint, the actual volume will be within 10% of the volume estimate 95% of the time, or maybe 90% of the time, or maybe 66% of the time. Maybe you better ask which probability level applies! You will probably also see a volume by species report and perhaps that will also provide statistical error reporting too. If it doesn’t, you should understand that because the sampling intensity for any given species is well below that of all of the species combined, the accuracy of the estimate drops pretty dramatically in a mixed species stand or forest. Now, digging into the cruise report a little deeper you will see that volumes may be reported by species and diameter class. How accurate do you think that will be? If the statistics are reported, that is great. If not, beware the value that you place in the numbers. This information can be useful but you have to assign it the appropriate credibility.
You should also understand that there are other sources of error in a cruise in addition to the statistical sampling error. Examples are the use of incorrect volume tables, measurement errors, poor sample design, calculation errors and, yes, a poor cruiser.
The statistical accuracy of large inventories that have been conducted over several different years and have been brought current using growth models is a different story. I’m not going to get into how to do this because I have no earthly idea how to do it! It can be done by a fairly limited group of forest statisticians, mensurationists and biometricians but it is clearly a difficult task. As a rule of thumb, it is safe to say that the accuracy is somewhat less than what would be calculated using the “ungrown” plots and declines as the number of “grown” years increases.
That’s enough said about cruise reports, inventories and the timber volumes that they report. Now let’s talk about volumes that what will be there tomorrow and the fundamentals of creating a future wood flow.
Future harvest volumes and timing must be done on a stand by stand basis utilizing stand volumes that have been “grown” using yield tables and growth and yield models. The starting base is the stand or strata level inventory and each stand or stratum is grown into the future. Some rule or methodology is then used to select the harvest date to determine the harvest volume for each future year. The result is a wood flow model that, when combined with values, becomes a key component of the cash flow model. More detail about this will be provided in the next post.
This is probably the appropriate place to discuss the integration of a GIS (Geographic Information System) with the timber inventory system when creating the information system used for timberland management. GIS based inventory systems are very common among managers of large tracts of timberland today and sellers normally provide output from these systems to potential buyers. Inventory or cruise volumes may say what is out there but the GIS says exactly WHERE it is on the surface of the earth. A quick check of the validity of the data provided by the seller can be made by auditing selected stands to compare inventory acreage, stocking, volumes, forest types, SI, etc. to the audited values. It doesn’t take much of this type of checking to determine how serious the forest managers have been about the quality and timeliness of their inventory efforts and hence the credence that can be placed in the data provided. The GIS data can be “read” into the GIS based harvest scheduling/ cash flow models and will eventually provide the basis for future management (activity schedules, maps and annual cash flow projections). These are the tools that become the foundation for communications and expectations between the new landowner and the timberland managers. The schedules tell the owner what to expect financially and form the basis of the management plan for the manager. A final point about the GIS based inventory system is that it provides the basis for a field audit in conjunction with the traditional financial audit. In the timberland sector, a financial audit without a corresponding field audit is a serious mistake; in fact, it's not really an audit.
Now let’s discuss timber values. They are down! A lot! If you are selling timber today, that is very important but how important is it with respect to timberland valuation? Should current market conditions be used for valuation?
The comments below are by Rick Holley (from Plum Creek 2008 Q3 Earnings Conference call) answering an analyst’s question about why he thinks timberland values are holding up while other asset classes are declining in value. The quote is a little messed up but his point is clear.
“I think largely because the investor in timberlands, and there’s still a fair amount of capital on the sidelines trying to invest in timberlands, is longer term. They’re looking through this cycle. If anything they’re starting to look at this cycle and lower prices as being more upside when you look out a year or two years or whatever these markets improve. I know there was a recent [Reese] article talking about some transactions that may or may not get done. We’re in the marketplace and we talk to a lot of buyers. We know who the sellers are, and we think all those transactions will in fact get done at very, very good prices, so I think the market is holding up and there’s still a lot of capital chasing very little opportunity…”
The key words above are “looking through…” with respect to timberland prices. To me, that implies that they are also “looking through” with respect to the timber values used in the timberland valuation. I think that if stumpage prices were at all-time highs, buyers would “look through” and see lower prices in the future as well. As Andy Malmquist, my good friend, former employee, and current TIMO guy, used to remind me about so many things… “It’s regressing toward the mean”! Andy actually talks like that.
There are at least three factors to consider for determining future timber values to apply to future volumes – current values, real price increases and inflation. We will discuss how to address inflation in the next post so for now, we will confine the discussion to the first two items.
I am defining “current price” as a “look through” price that is on the trend line for the species,local area and region (huge differences between NE and NW, cherry and red maple). In other words, I am looking for the price that has “regressed to the mean”. This data can be obtained from several different pricing services such as Forest2Market, RISI and Timber-Mart South. In addition, most state forestry commissions (South Carolina Forestry Commission pricing report) or forestry university extension services also provide some level of pricing reports. Local consulting foresters usually know what is available and can also provide first hand local knowledge. Pricing from these sources will provide the baseline for projecting the value of future harvests in the cash flow model.
A real increase in future stumpage prices can and should be incorporated into the model if you think it is justified. U. S. Forest Service reports suggest that sawtimber stumpage prices have increased at a real rate of 2% a year over a very long period of time. An analysis of southern pine stumpage prices by forest economist Jack Lutz reached the following conclusion:
“Our analysis indicates that southern pine sawtimber stumpage prices are mean-reverting, with a 50-year mean of $38.29/ton (based on LDAF data). Those prices have held to that mean through 50 years of timber supply and demand shocks and significant changes in timber harvesting and processing technology. That means we should not expect a significant increase in sawtimber stumpage prices in the near future. This supports the current practice of many timberland investors who are using 0% real appreciation rates in their timberland investment models.”
The future is anybodies guess but the real value increase used should be based upon your view of the future. That’s why there is always a high bidder and a low bidder!
This concludes the discussion on timber volumes and values. The next post in the series will attempt to tie it all together by addressing the methodologies associated with the discounted cash flow models. Comments are welcomed. --Brian
Friday, January 16, 2009
How Much Did Timberland Values Fall in 2008?
My stock portfolio has certainly taken a hit to the downside. The housing market has tanked and the values of many houses and rental units have gone down with it. Stocks of the publicly traded timberland owners have gone down 20 to 60% in the last year or so. The logic is that the decline in housing has caused a drop in lumber price which has created a drop in timber (stumpage) price which has resulted in a corresponding drop in timberland prices. So logically my portfolio has taken a hit on the tree farm side too. But has it?
I do some consulting with market analysts and hedge fund managers interested in valuing timberland and the drivers behind it. The most common question that I have heard recently surrounds the declining value of timberland and just how great that decline is. How can a company like Weyerhaeuser or Plum Creek be properly valued given the logical decline in timberland values? I could give my opinion (and I always do!) but that is not enough.
I have been maintaining a database of the major timberland transactions for over a decade so I wanted to quantify the change for 2008. Below is a chart showing the $/acre sale price trend for the last decade.
This is pretty interesting. Nationwide, it appears that prices have dropped about 21% following a year where they gained 60%! BUT… it is important to understand the data and what is happening. This database is composed of transactions that total between one and seven million acres in any given year. Also in the database is a “REGIONS” field. Price distortion occurs between years due to the variation in the percentage of sales occurring between regions ($/acre varies significantly between regions). So how does the price per acre change if we just look at a single region? Let’s look at the South.
Within any particular region, individual transactions will impact any given years weighted average price. In spite of that, the trend is clear and it is difficult to find any argument in the data that supports a decline in timberland pricing – at least in the South. The first reported sale for 2009, Potlatch to RMK, was at $1,745/acre, right in the ballpark.
The Northeast is the only region that did show a drop last year. The acreage sold in the NE was not particularly large (meaning most of the variability was probably due to the variability between tracts) so I would be reluctant to attribute much significance to the decline. There was one significant datapoint though. The Essex Timber to Plum Creek transaction (at $267/acre) pulled the average down. It is important to note that there was a conservation easement on this tract. We should expect to see significantly lower transaction values as more sales occur on tracts with existing conservation easements. The sale of a conservation easement provides revenue in the form of an early payment for HBU land but it can also have a negative impact on future forestry based revenues as well.
So…, what does all of this mean? I can see little or no decline in timberland values. I’ll be curious to see what the NCREIF index on timberland values has to say. The index is based more on appraisals than actual sales but the appraisals SHOULD be based on comparable sales and comparable sales just do not support a decline in appraisal values. If sale prices are not declining, what is wrong with the logic expressed in the first paragraph – declining housing starts means declining timberland values?
Here is my take. First, buyers are “looking through” current timber prices. Sophisticated timberland investors use appraisal techniques that look at cash flow from timber over the planned life of the investment. Those timber values are based on their view of the future, not just today’s market.
Second, more money is chasing fewer acres. A significant amount of timberland is being pulled from the market. Example: almost all of the 161,000 acres of Finch and Pruyn timberland in the Adirondacks will ultimately be withdrawn from production and become a part of the Forest Preserve. An example from the other side of the equation: this week the United Nations announced that its pension fund would diversify its portfolio and seek to acquire timberland. More money chasing fewer acres. Institutions want to diversify their portfolios, particularly by acquiring hard assets.
Third, future wood demand will be impacted by both renewable energy and global warming concerns. We are already seeing pellet mills being built to export pellets to Europe where they are mixed with coal to reduce the amount of carbon tax the utilities must pay. Most forecasters expect to see a similar tax in the U.S. soon.
Fourth, there is evidence that declining interest rates are impacting the discount rates used by institutional timberland purchasers. A declining discount rate drives value up!
These are my thoughts, these are my numbers, and these are my opinions. Comments are welcomed. --Brian
I do some consulting with market analysts and hedge fund managers interested in valuing timberland and the drivers behind it. The most common question that I have heard recently surrounds the declining value of timberland and just how great that decline is. How can a company like Weyerhaeuser or Plum Creek be properly valued given the logical decline in timberland values? I could give my opinion (and I always do!) but that is not enough.
I have been maintaining a database of the major timberland transactions for over a decade so I wanted to quantify the change for 2008. Below is a chart showing the $/acre sale price trend for the last decade.
This is pretty interesting. Nationwide, it appears that prices have dropped about 21% following a year where they gained 60%! BUT… it is important to understand the data and what is happening. This database is composed of transactions that total between one and seven million acres in any given year. Also in the database is a “REGIONS” field. Price distortion occurs between years due to the variation in the percentage of sales occurring between regions ($/acre varies significantly between regions). So how does the price per acre change if we just look at a single region? Let’s look at the South.
Within any particular region, individual transactions will impact any given years weighted average price. In spite of that, the trend is clear and it is difficult to find any argument in the data that supports a decline in timberland pricing – at least in the South. The first reported sale for 2009, Potlatch to RMK, was at $1,745/acre, right in the ballpark.
The Northeast is the only region that did show a drop last year. The acreage sold in the NE was not particularly large (meaning most of the variability was probably due to the variability between tracts) so I would be reluctant to attribute much significance to the decline. There was one significant datapoint though. The Essex Timber to Plum Creek transaction (at $267/acre) pulled the average down. It is important to note that there was a conservation easement on this tract. We should expect to see significantly lower transaction values as more sales occur on tracts with existing conservation easements. The sale of a conservation easement provides revenue in the form of an early payment for HBU land but it can also have a negative impact on future forestry based revenues as well.
So…, what does all of this mean? I can see little or no decline in timberland values. I’ll be curious to see what the NCREIF index on timberland values has to say. The index is based more on appraisals than actual sales but the appraisals SHOULD be based on comparable sales and comparable sales just do not support a decline in appraisal values. If sale prices are not declining, what is wrong with the logic expressed in the first paragraph – declining housing starts means declining timberland values?
Here is my take. First, buyers are “looking through” current timber prices. Sophisticated timberland investors use appraisal techniques that look at cash flow from timber over the planned life of the investment. Those timber values are based on their view of the future, not just today’s market.
Second, more money is chasing fewer acres. A significant amount of timberland is being pulled from the market. Example: almost all of the 161,000 acres of Finch and Pruyn timberland in the Adirondacks will ultimately be withdrawn from production and become a part of the Forest Preserve. An example from the other side of the equation: this week the United Nations announced that its pension fund would diversify its portfolio and seek to acquire timberland. More money chasing fewer acres. Institutions want to diversify their portfolios, particularly by acquiring hard assets.
Third, future wood demand will be impacted by both renewable energy and global warming concerns. We are already seeing pellet mills being built to export pellets to Europe where they are mixed with coal to reduce the amount of carbon tax the utilities must pay. Most forecasters expect to see a similar tax in the U.S. soon.
Fourth, there is evidence that declining interest rates are impacting the discount rates used by institutional timberland purchasers. A declining discount rate drives value up!
These are my thoughts, these are my numbers, and these are my opinions. Comments are welcomed. --Brian
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Timberland – Keep it or sell it?
I like to look forward and speculate about what is going to happen. Sometimes with a good analysis, sometimes with just a good guess. Either way, nobody can say that you’re right or wrong. Only time can do that. And it does.
But once in awhile it is good to look back. Maybe to say “I told you so” or perhaps to see just how foolish I have been with some of my prognostications. Either way, the value is in the looking.
About ten years or so ago the TIMO sector was starting to grow in earnest. It was clear (to some at least) that C Corp ownership of timberland was probably not the best ownership structure. The large timberland owners were all Integrated Forest Products Companies (IFPCs) and some had already been experimenting with different corporate structures such as LPs and REITs. Most were maintaining the status quo and capitalizing on TIMO investor driven demand by selling off their “non-strategic” holdings to generate cash or reportable earnings.
By 2000, the pulp and paper industry was about five years into some very bad times from a profitability standpoint. The investment community (and I know many of my readers are market analysts - so pay attention to this little trip back in time), had one mantra. “Sell your timberland and pay down debt”. The decade before that it was all about percent self-sufficiency. The higher the level of self-sufficiency (the more land owned), the more favorable the analysts view of the company. Mantras change abruptly.
Interesting discussions occurred in many offices during the two or three years before and after 2000. (“Let’s keep the land and sell the mills!” – Heresy!). Reactions to the analysts’ demands (or maybe to the poor profits) were varied. In some cases, corporate management bought into the analysts view, other managers explored and ultimately implemented the evolving REIT structure and one major company maintained the status quo. So who was right? Perhaps this chart will shed a little light on the issue.
But once in awhile it is good to look back. Maybe to say “I told you so” or perhaps to see just how foolish I have been with some of my prognostications. Either way, the value is in the looking.
About ten years or so ago the TIMO sector was starting to grow in earnest. It was clear (to some at least) that C Corp ownership of timberland was probably not the best ownership structure. The large timberland owners were all Integrated Forest Products Companies (IFPCs) and some had already been experimenting with different corporate structures such as LPs and REITs. Most were maintaining the status quo and capitalizing on TIMO investor driven demand by selling off their “non-strategic” holdings to generate cash or reportable earnings.
By 2000, the pulp and paper industry was about five years into some very bad times from a profitability standpoint. The investment community (and I know many of my readers are market analysts - so pay attention to this little trip back in time), had one mantra. “Sell your timberland and pay down debt”. The decade before that it was all about percent self-sufficiency. The higher the level of self-sufficiency (the more land owned), the more favorable the analysts view of the company. Mantras change abruptly.
Interesting discussions occurred in many offices during the two or three years before and after 2000. (“Let’s keep the land and sell the mills!” – Heresy!). Reactions to the analysts’ demands (or maybe to the poor profits) were varied. In some cases, corporate management bought into the analysts view, other managers explored and ultimately implemented the evolving REIT structure and one major company maintained the status quo. So who was right? Perhaps this chart will shed a little light on the issue.
Picking Weyerhaeuser as the major representative (about the only one actually) of the “status quo” decision makers, I’ve compared their stock prices to the REIT crowd (PCH, PCL and RYN) and the timberland divestures crowd (represented by IP, MWV and LPX) over the past five years. What does this tell us?
The status quo decision was right in the middle with respect to stock price performance.
An examination of the three timberland sellers (those that restructured based on the advice and pressure of the analysts) were all losers – some big time losers. Analysts pay attention. Your advice and pressure destroyed a great deal of shareholder value. But then again, it wasn’t your fault. The fault lies squarely with the senior management that took those companies down that course. The final chapter has yet to be written for these firms but it sure doesn’t look like the right decision at this point.
The shareholders of the three companies that saw the REIT opportunity and charted their own course through a complex and somewhat risky maze were very well rewarded relative to the others. All three of these companies actually acquired land over the five year period. What a difference is made by good strategic decisions on the part of senior management. History pins the Gold Medal on Rayonier’s senior management team. –Brian
The status quo decision was right in the middle with respect to stock price performance.
An examination of the three timberland sellers (those that restructured based on the advice and pressure of the analysts) were all losers – some big time losers. Analysts pay attention. Your advice and pressure destroyed a great deal of shareholder value. But then again, it wasn’t your fault. The fault lies squarely with the senior management that took those companies down that course. The final chapter has yet to be written for these firms but it sure doesn’t look like the right decision at this point.
The shareholders of the three companies that saw the REIT opportunity and charted their own course through a complex and somewhat risky maze were very well rewarded relative to the others. All three of these companies actually acquired land over the five year period. What a difference is made by good strategic decisions on the part of senior management. History pins the Gold Medal on Rayonier’s senior management team. –Brian
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
The Vertically Integrated TIMO?
One of my readers pointed out an interesting development to me recently. As has become so obvious, the vertically integrated forest product companies (VIFPC) are almost a thing of the past due to the elimination of favorable capital gains tax rates and the high tax rates on C corporations. The pass-through tax structure for TIMOs (pension funds) and REITs has pretty well destroyed the VIFPC as a viable tax structure. So the new landowners and managers become true timberland companies unburdened by the tax structure brought by those pesky mills.
The interesting observation is that The Forestland Group has recently completed the first part of the purchase of Roy O Martin's LeMoyen, Louisiana, hardwood sawmill, 10,000 acres of hardwood timberland, and 20-year harvesting rights on an additional 138,000 acres of hardwood timberland in south Louisiana. Read more.
Now back up about two years to when Anderson-Tully "merged" with one of The Forestland Group's funds. ATCO had a huge hardwood sawmill in Vicksburg billed as the largest hardwood sawmill in North America. You can read about that transaction here.
So now we have a new acronym (we need a new acronym), the VITIMO! It will be interesting to watch this trend develop, if it is a trend. When The Forestland Group buys its first pulp mill, I'll know its for real! --Brian
The interesting observation is that The Forestland Group has recently completed the first part of the purchase of Roy O Martin's LeMoyen, Louisiana, hardwood sawmill, 10,000 acres of hardwood timberland, and 20-year harvesting rights on an additional 138,000 acres of hardwood timberland in south Louisiana. Read more.
Now back up about two years to when Anderson-Tully "merged" with one of The Forestland Group's funds. ATCO had a huge hardwood sawmill in Vicksburg billed as the largest hardwood sawmill in North America. You can read about that transaction here.
So now we have a new acronym (we need a new acronym), the VITIMO! It will be interesting to watch this trend develop, if it is a trend. When The Forestland Group buys its first pulp mill, I'll know its for real! --Brian
Thursday, March 13, 2008
Funding Fire Control
I live in a 20 year loblolly pine plantation in the Lowcountry of South Carolina. Fire has long been a part of life here. From the fire ecosystem implemented by Indians centuries ago to the cooperative (S.C. Forestry Commission, U.S. Forest Service, International Paper and Westvaco Corp.) fire control efforts of a decade ago, fire has been an important part of life and forest management here. As industry disposed of it's timberland, the burden shifted to the Forestry Commission and, to a lesser degree, the U. S. Forest Service (Francis Marion National Forest). As smoke related lawsuits from prescribed burning increased, prescribed burning declined and fuel loads have increased. This all has happened in the face of declining budgets for both fire control organizations. What has happened in the Lowcountry is a microcosim of the situation in the entire South and, to a lesser degree, the entire nation.
In recommendations to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies regarding the FY2009 Budget for the U.S. Forest Service, George M. Leonard - Chairman, Board of Directors, National Association of Forest Service Retirees had this to say:
"The most critical issue that needs to be addressed in the Forest Service budget is the funding of fire suppression. The current procedure of including the ten-year average cost of fire suppression within the agency’s discretionary budget is destroying the capability of the Forest Service to carryout the remainder of its statutory missions. From 25 percent in FY2000, fire funding is now approaching 50 percent of the budget. The suppression cost trend means the ten-year average is going to continue to grow, further cannibalizing funding for other programs. While the overall Forest Service budget has increased nine percent over the last six years, the diversion of funds to fire suppression has had a major impact on the workforce available to carry out the multiple-use mission of the agency. The number of foresters, biologists, and other resource specialists, along with supporting technicians, is a good measure of the capability of a resource management agency to carry out its mission. As illustrated in the following table, the capability of the Forest Service has been seriously compromised."
You get the point, but if you want to read more, go here.
The SC Forestry Commission's situation is equally as bad, perhaps worse. Here are a few facts.
When adjusted for inflation, the current budget is 30% less than it was in 2001.
• Aging firefighting equipment is not being replaced on a timely schedule.
• Fuel costs are soaring.
• Hiring and retaining qualified firefighters is difficult due to a more urban economy and changing demographics.
• Forest industry changes have led to a loss of cooperator capacity, both personnel and equipment.
• Recent housing development has expanded into wooded areas, creating communities with very high fire risk.
• Forestry has a tremendous impact on SC’s economy: #1 employer, #2 payroll, #1 harvested crop, $1 billion in exports, $17 billion total economic impact.
• The Commission’s $18 million baseline budget investment is supporting a $17 billion industry economic impact, a multiplier of almost 1000.
If you have a home in SC, or own/manage timberland here, now would be a good time to contact your Senators in support of this years budget request, in particular, the members of the Senate Finance sub-committee responsible for reviewing the request. Those are Senators Yancy McGill from Williamsburg county, Larry Grooms from Berkeley county, Phil Leventis from Sumter county, and John Drummond from Greenwood county. By the way, these senators have been very supportive of forestry and fire control. Something to keep in mind the next time you go to the polls!
This post may appear to be somewhat local in nature but be assured that the words that you have read apply right outside your door, to your timberland and to your National Forest as well. What are you going to do about it? --Brian
In recommendations to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies regarding the FY2009 Budget for the U.S. Forest Service, George M. Leonard - Chairman, Board of Directors, National Association of Forest Service Retirees had this to say:
"The most critical issue that needs to be addressed in the Forest Service budget is the funding of fire suppression. The current procedure of including the ten-year average cost of fire suppression within the agency’s discretionary budget is destroying the capability of the Forest Service to carryout the remainder of its statutory missions. From 25 percent in FY2000, fire funding is now approaching 50 percent of the budget. The suppression cost trend means the ten-year average is going to continue to grow, further cannibalizing funding for other programs. While the overall Forest Service budget has increased nine percent over the last six years, the diversion of funds to fire suppression has had a major impact on the workforce available to carry out the multiple-use mission of the agency. The number of foresters, biologists, and other resource specialists, along with supporting technicians, is a good measure of the capability of a resource management agency to carry out its mission. As illustrated in the following table, the capability of the Forest Service has been seriously compromised."
You get the point, but if you want to read more, go here.
The SC Forestry Commission's situation is equally as bad, perhaps worse. Here are a few facts.
When adjusted for inflation, the current budget is 30% less than it was in 2001.
• Aging firefighting equipment is not being replaced on a timely schedule.
• Fuel costs are soaring.
• Hiring and retaining qualified firefighters is difficult due to a more urban economy and changing demographics.
• Forest industry changes have led to a loss of cooperator capacity, both personnel and equipment.
• Recent housing development has expanded into wooded areas, creating communities with very high fire risk.
• Forestry has a tremendous impact on SC’s economy: #1 employer, #2 payroll, #1 harvested crop, $1 billion in exports, $17 billion total economic impact.
• The Commission’s $18 million baseline budget investment is supporting a $17 billion industry economic impact, a multiplier of almost 1000.
If you have a home in SC, or own/manage timberland here, now would be a good time to contact your Senators in support of this years budget request, in particular, the members of the Senate Finance sub-committee responsible for reviewing the request. Those are Senators Yancy McGill from Williamsburg county, Larry Grooms from Berkeley county, Phil Leventis from Sumter county, and John Drummond from Greenwood county. By the way, these senators have been very supportive of forestry and fire control. Something to keep in mind the next time you go to the polls!
This post may appear to be somewhat local in nature but be assured that the words that you have read apply right outside your door, to your timberland and to your National Forest as well. What are you going to do about it? --Brian
Monday, March 3, 2008
Longleaf Pine
If you read my Blog through email subscription rather than visiting the Blog site, you probably have forgotten the byline. So..., The Timberland Blog: Examining the changes in timberland ownership and what those changes might mean. The pulp and paper industry was very focused on maximizing growth as opposed to the financial return focused on by the institutional investors. Management objectives are a primary key to what the future forest will look like. That's fact.
Way back in '67 while working on a major cruise/appraisal for the West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company, I remember vividly a sign near Washington, Georgia that said “Wilkes County, Gone to Grass”. I was with friend and mentor Kenney P. Funderburke, who said wryly “the sign should say, Gone to Loblolly Pine!”. Times change, economics change, landowners change, management objectives change, the forest changes. Like Wilkes County, the South went from natural forest, to cotton, to pasture, to loblolly pine for fiber production to whatever is next. What is next? For some of the Southern forest, maybe a return to the longleaf pine that once dominated this landscape. Management objective of optimizing financial return permitting.
If you are familiar with the longleaf and loblolly, the comparisons jump into your head very quickly. Longleaf is straight. Loblolly is crooked. Loblolly grows faster (at least initially). Loblolly occupies a broader range of sites. Longleaf is straight.
The lower pulpwood prices, combined with a focus on financial return of the new owners, provides an opportunity for longleaf to reassert itself. Back in the days when the land was managed by Native Americans, the objective of management was to burn the forest to prepare it for agriculture, provide nitrogen fertilization, reduce ticks and chiggers, improve hunting, grow broomstraw for housing, and to be able to see enemies lurking in the forest. That's some pretty powerful reasons to burn. At that time, the EPA was less concerned with smoke, environmentalists were less concerned with pine monoculture, and there were fewer lurking lawyers in the forests. The point here, is that the longleaf forest was not “natural”, it was created by its managers based on the objectives of management. These managers created a pine forest of an estimated 60 – 90 million acres that was reduced to less than three million acres in 1996 by a series of landowners whose objectives were cotton, rice, beef, soybeans, and wood fiber production. If longleaf is to expand replacing some of the loblolly acreage, that expansion must fit with the objectives of the new management – that being financial performance as opposed to the fiber productivity objective of the pulp and paper industry. I think it can do it. So do the sawmilling families that have owned and managed the longleaf remnants for the past 75 years.
The fact that longleaf is so straight can go a long way in a comparative economic analysis. The Longleaf Alliance has some financial analysis on its web site which illustrates the gains from increased pole production and the increased value of the poles over sawtimber. I didn't notice the increase in proportion of sawtimber to pulpwood characterized by longleaf stands although it may have been there. The growth and yield models do show that loblolly's growth advantage diminishes or disappears as the rotation age increases. In addition, nursery and silvicultural improvements have reduced the amount of time it takes to get the seedlings up and out of the grass stage thereby reducing the rotation age and improving the financial performance of longleaf. At any rate, it looks to me like the economics are there, at least on some sites.
I don't want to forget us Family Forest owners. Collectively, we own a lot more of the former longleaf forest than the institutional investors by a long shot. And our “management objectives” are generally broader than those of the investment community. The Feds are working to help us understand and to put money in our pockets if we will convert to longleaf and do it their way. So far, it seems to be working with a couple of hundred thousand acres being planted each year. That's enough to turn the tide and longleaf acreage is actually increasing now. It may not be increasing much but at least the decline has been arrested.
So..., what does all this mean? We are in the early stages of a change in the South's forest which will in fact see more of the landscape revert to the beauty of the historic longleaf pine forest that defined the “pineywoods” of the Old South. There is something about longleaf that stirs the soul, loblolly doesn't. --Brian
Way back in '67 while working on a major cruise/appraisal for the West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company, I remember vividly a sign near Washington, Georgia that said “Wilkes County, Gone to Grass”. I was with friend and mentor Kenney P. Funderburke, who said wryly “the sign should say, Gone to Loblolly Pine!”. Times change, economics change, landowners change, management objectives change, the forest changes. Like Wilkes County, the South went from natural forest, to cotton, to pasture, to loblolly pine for fiber production to whatever is next. What is next? For some of the Southern forest, maybe a return to the longleaf pine that once dominated this landscape. Management objective of optimizing financial return permitting.
If you are familiar with the longleaf and loblolly, the comparisons jump into your head very quickly. Longleaf is straight. Loblolly is crooked. Loblolly grows faster (at least initially). Loblolly occupies a broader range of sites. Longleaf is straight.
The lower pulpwood prices, combined with a focus on financial return of the new owners, provides an opportunity for longleaf to reassert itself. Back in the days when the land was managed by Native Americans, the objective of management was to burn the forest to prepare it for agriculture, provide nitrogen fertilization, reduce ticks and chiggers, improve hunting, grow broomstraw for housing, and to be able to see enemies lurking in the forest. That's some pretty powerful reasons to burn. At that time, the EPA was less concerned with smoke, environmentalists were less concerned with pine monoculture, and there were fewer lurking lawyers in the forests. The point here, is that the longleaf forest was not “natural”, it was created by its managers based on the objectives of management. These managers created a pine forest of an estimated 60 – 90 million acres that was reduced to less than three million acres in 1996 by a series of landowners whose objectives were cotton, rice, beef, soybeans, and wood fiber production. If longleaf is to expand replacing some of the loblolly acreage, that expansion must fit with the objectives of the new management – that being financial performance as opposed to the fiber productivity objective of the pulp and paper industry. I think it can do it. So do the sawmilling families that have owned and managed the longleaf remnants for the past 75 years.
The fact that longleaf is so straight can go a long way in a comparative economic analysis. The Longleaf Alliance has some financial analysis on its web site which illustrates the gains from increased pole production and the increased value of the poles over sawtimber. I didn't notice the increase in proportion of sawtimber to pulpwood characterized by longleaf stands although it may have been there. The growth and yield models do show that loblolly's growth advantage diminishes or disappears as the rotation age increases. In addition, nursery and silvicultural improvements have reduced the amount of time it takes to get the seedlings up and out of the grass stage thereby reducing the rotation age and improving the financial performance of longleaf. At any rate, it looks to me like the economics are there, at least on some sites.
I don't want to forget us Family Forest owners. Collectively, we own a lot more of the former longleaf forest than the institutional investors by a long shot. And our “management objectives” are generally broader than those of the investment community. The Feds are working to help us understand and to put money in our pockets if we will convert to longleaf and do it their way. So far, it seems to be working with a couple of hundred thousand acres being planted each year. That's enough to turn the tide and longleaf acreage is actually increasing now. It may not be increasing much but at least the decline has been arrested.
So..., what does all this mean? We are in the early stages of a change in the South's forest which will in fact see more of the landscape revert to the beauty of the historic longleaf pine forest that defined the “pineywoods” of the Old South. There is something about longleaf that stirs the soul, loblolly doesn't. --Brian
Thursday, February 14, 2008
ETF as Surrogate for Timberland Investment
In the Feb. 18th issue of Business Week, there is an article entitled "Wood Paneling for Your Portfolio". I'll start with a couple of quotes from the article and then I'll disect them.
"Buying timberland is one of the ways big guys running pension plans and endowment funds have diversified their holdings away from financial market trends and earned fairly stable double-digit returns to boot. But timberland has been mostly off-limits to individual investors, because it requires millions of dollars to buy in."
"Enter the Claymore/Clear Global Timber Index ETF. It's a new exchange-traded fund that invests in stocks of companies with the world's greatest exposure to timberland. It amps up the exposure by weighting the 27 stocks in the portfolio not by market capitalization but by actual acres companies own."
"This sort of everyman version of a timberland play..."
Okay, that's enough. I've been reading about this ETF as a surrogate for timberland ownership since its inception and I would like to say very LOUDLY and clearly that this is NOT a timberland play.
First, let's consider the above quote "timberland has been mostly off-limits to individual investors, because it requires millions of dollars to buy in." No it does not. Small tracts of timberland with all of the advantages of larger tracts are available for purchase. The use of a LLC allows investors to combine financial resources to acquire larger tracts. You can even purchase timberland within an IRA. Consulting foresters in all regions of the country are available to assist with appraisals and management. Many of these consultants are the same people assisting the institutional investors with timberland acquisition and management. If you want a timberland pure play, you will have to buy timberland and it is within the reach of most investors. If you want to get an idea of what is available for sale and pricing, just do a Google search on timberland for sale or consulting foresters in your geographic area of interest. If you want to learn more about buying small tracts of timberland, you might want to buy and read Curtis Seltzer's "How To Be a DIRT-SMART Buyer of Country Property". There is a lot of info in it that can put you on the right road. Before you buy, you will still need a consulting forester or someone else very familiar with timber values, land productivity and the local market. If you want to delve into the concept of timberland as an investment, I'd recommend "Timberland Investments" by Chris Sinkhan, et. al. which is pretty much the classic in that field.
So, no, you don't need "millions of dollars" to buy timberland!
Now let's look at the Claymore/Clear Global Timber Index ETF and see why it is not an "everyman version of a timberland play". To be fair to Business Week, they are not the only ones promoting this ETF as a surrogate for owning timberland. I have seen at least a dozen articles with similar comments.
Below is a list of the holdings in the Clear Global Timber Index along with the percentage weighting of each. As you scroll down through the list, ask yourself the following questions.
Top Fund Holdings as of 2/13/08
Name/Weight
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO/5.48%
VOTORANTIM CELULOSE E PAPEL SA/5.46%
ARACRUZ CELULOSE S.A. ADR/5.17%
POTLATCH CORP/4.86%
SINO-FOREST CORP/4.83%
RAYONIER INC/4.78%
SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB-B SHARES/4.77%
SAPPI LTD/4.74%
TIMBERWEST FOREST CORP/4.61%
PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO INC/4.60%
WEYERHAEUSER CO/4.60%
SUMITOMO FORESTRY CO LTD/4.56%
HOLMEN AB SER B/4.55%
MEADWESTVACO CORP/4.49%
GUNNS LTD/4.45%
OJI PAPER CO. LTD./4.33%
SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP PLC/4.28%
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL/3.76%
CHINA GRAND FORESTRY RESOURCES/3.22%
DELTIC TIMBER CORP/2.71%
WEST FRASER TIMBER CO LTD/2.67%
HOKUETSU PAPER MILLS LTD/2.48%
GREAT SOUTHERN PLANTATION/2.13%
CANFOR CORP/1.25%
TIMBERCORP LTD/1.21%
If you answered the questions, it should be very clear that this index is NOT a timberland play but in many cases, it is just the opposite. For example, as timber and timberland prices increase, you would expect the value of the index to increase as well. Here is a quote from MeadWestvaco's news release following its last quarter.
"Higher input costs for wood ...negatively impacted profitability."
The corporate structure of many of the key holdings above is very similar to that of MWV. This ETF may be a good investment, I can't say, but it is certainly NOT a surragate for timberland ownership. It reflects a global pulp and paper play.
So..., is it possible to invest in stock as a timberland play? Maybe, kind of, in a way. At a minimum, we can do a heck of a lot better than this ETF. We'll do it by creating a basket of stocks from the above list that really are backed up by timberland and that have little or no exposure to pulp and paper. Let's also eliminate the bulk of the foreign stocks which, to a degree, have currency exchange risk associated with them (You may think that the dollar will continue to decline so they will be a good investment but that is not timberland investing, that's currency investing - then again, you might think that the dollar is about to turn around...).
Let's start by putting check marks by Plum Creek, Potlatch and Rayonier. All have significant timberland acreage, little or no exposure to pulp and paper, and a tax efficient corporate structure (REIT). The timberland in these three stocks provides plenty of geographic, species and market diversity. That diversity substantially reduces many of the risks associated with both timberland and stock investing. I believe that this basket will come as close to owning timberland as you can get. If you want to add a few more, consider Deltic Timber (timberland and lumber mills), Pope Resources (a MLP), and Weyerhaeuser (six million acres but pulp and paper, lumber mills, currency risk, and inefficient tax structure). Weyerhaeuser is a particularly interesting addition because its current market cap is less than estimates of the timberland value. In addition, a probable change in the tax structure will likely result in a significant increase is share price. So let's create a basket with three to six of these stocks and forget the ETF. It will be more reflective of a timberland investment.
But remember, too, that it is NOT timberland. It is stock - be that good or bad. On the positive side, the stock basket is much more liquid than a timberland investment. The stable, continuously rising value of timberland will be absent. Daily values will change with the stock market. Value will rise and fall with major market influences like housing. Quarterly profit will impact the stock price (no matter how foolish). Last week an analyst reported that Potlatch was a better buy than Plum Creek. I checked the stock prices for the two of them and Potlatch was up about 3.5% and Plum Creek was down by 3.5%!!! The value of the timberland at neither company had changed one penny but the difference in value of the two companies was 7%! These types of moves may be foolish but they are also reality.
So..., this may raise a couple of questions in your mind. First question: How can we do a better job at selecting stocks to "kind of" mirror timberland investments than a professional investment firm like Claymore? Answer: Due to laws and regulations that apply to mutual funds and ETF's, they are restricted from taking a position that exceeds 5% of the fund. That means that they must take a bare bones number of 20 different companies in the ETF and there are not 20 companies out there that even approach being true timberland plays. We win not because we are better but because we are blessed with more flexiblity.
Second question: How could Business Week's assesment be so far off? Answer: ?? --Brian
"Buying timberland is one of the ways big guys running pension plans and endowment funds have diversified their holdings away from financial market trends and earned fairly stable double-digit returns to boot. But timberland has been mostly off-limits to individual investors, because it requires millions of dollars to buy in."
"Enter the Claymore/Clear Global Timber Index ETF. It's a new exchange-traded fund that invests in stocks of companies with the world's greatest exposure to timberland. It amps up the exposure by weighting the 27 stocks in the portfolio not by market capitalization but by actual acres companies own."
"This sort of everyman version of a timberland play..."
Okay, that's enough. I've been reading about this ETF as a surrogate for timberland ownership since its inception and I would like to say very LOUDLY and clearly that this is NOT a timberland play.
First, let's consider the above quote "timberland has been mostly off-limits to individual investors, because it requires millions of dollars to buy in." No it does not. Small tracts of timberland with all of the advantages of larger tracts are available for purchase. The use of a LLC allows investors to combine financial resources to acquire larger tracts. You can even purchase timberland within an IRA. Consulting foresters in all regions of the country are available to assist with appraisals and management. Many of these consultants are the same people assisting the institutional investors with timberland acquisition and management. If you want a timberland pure play, you will have to buy timberland and it is within the reach of most investors. If you want to get an idea of what is available for sale and pricing, just do a Google search on timberland for sale or consulting foresters in your geographic area of interest. If you want to learn more about buying small tracts of timberland, you might want to buy and read Curtis Seltzer's "How To Be a DIRT-SMART Buyer of Country Property". There is a lot of info in it that can put you on the right road. Before you buy, you will still need a consulting forester or someone else very familiar with timber values, land productivity and the local market. If you want to delve into the concept of timberland as an investment, I'd recommend "Timberland Investments" by Chris Sinkhan, et. al. which is pretty much the classic in that field.
So, no, you don't need "millions of dollars" to buy timberland!
Now let's look at the Claymore/Clear Global Timber Index ETF and see why it is not an "everyman version of a timberland play". To be fair to Business Week, they are not the only ones promoting this ETF as a surrogate for owning timberland. I have seen at least a dozen articles with similar comments.
Below is a list of the holdings in the Clear Global Timber Index along with the percentage weighting of each. As you scroll down through the list, ask yourself the following questions.
- Is the primary asset of this company timberland?
- Does this company own any land or has it sold its timberland?
- Is the stock weighting in the portfolio "by actual acres companies own" as claimed in the article?
- Is this company forced to acquire its timber on the open market (or at market price if there is a fiber supply/lease agreement)?
- What level of fiber self-sufficiency does this company have?
- Does this company grow and sell more timber than it uses?
- Is this company the exact opposite of a timberland play?
- Is this index/ETF more reflective of the global pulp and paper industry index than timber or timberland?
Top Fund Holdings as of 2/13/08
Name/Weight
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO/5.48%
VOTORANTIM CELULOSE E PAPEL SA/5.46%
ARACRUZ CELULOSE S.A. ADR/5.17%
POTLATCH CORP/4.86%
SINO-FOREST CORP/4.83%
RAYONIER INC/4.78%
SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB-B SHARES/4.77%
SAPPI LTD/4.74%
TIMBERWEST FOREST CORP/4.61%
PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO INC/4.60%
WEYERHAEUSER CO/4.60%
SUMITOMO FORESTRY CO LTD/4.56%
HOLMEN AB SER B/4.55%
MEADWESTVACO CORP/4.49%
GUNNS LTD/4.45%
OJI PAPER CO. LTD./4.33%
SMURFIT KAPPA GROUP PLC/4.28%
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL/3.76%
CHINA GRAND FORESTRY RESOURCES/3.22%
DELTIC TIMBER CORP/2.71%
WEST FRASER TIMBER CO LTD/2.67%
HOKUETSU PAPER MILLS LTD/2.48%
GREAT SOUTHERN PLANTATION/2.13%
CANFOR CORP/1.25%
TIMBERCORP LTD/1.21%
If you answered the questions, it should be very clear that this index is NOT a timberland play but in many cases, it is just the opposite. For example, as timber and timberland prices increase, you would expect the value of the index to increase as well. Here is a quote from MeadWestvaco's news release following its last quarter.
"Higher input costs for wood ...negatively impacted profitability."
The corporate structure of many of the key holdings above is very similar to that of MWV. This ETF may be a good investment, I can't say, but it is certainly NOT a surragate for timberland ownership. It reflects a global pulp and paper play.
So..., is it possible to invest in stock as a timberland play? Maybe, kind of, in a way. At a minimum, we can do a heck of a lot better than this ETF. We'll do it by creating a basket of stocks from the above list that really are backed up by timberland and that have little or no exposure to pulp and paper. Let's also eliminate the bulk of the foreign stocks which, to a degree, have currency exchange risk associated with them (You may think that the dollar will continue to decline so they will be a good investment but that is not timberland investing, that's currency investing - then again, you might think that the dollar is about to turn around...).
Let's start by putting check marks by Plum Creek, Potlatch and Rayonier. All have significant timberland acreage, little or no exposure to pulp and paper, and a tax efficient corporate structure (REIT). The timberland in these three stocks provides plenty of geographic, species and market diversity. That diversity substantially reduces many of the risks associated with both timberland and stock investing. I believe that this basket will come as close to owning timberland as you can get. If you want to add a few more, consider Deltic Timber (timberland and lumber mills), Pope Resources (a MLP), and Weyerhaeuser (six million acres but pulp and paper, lumber mills, currency risk, and inefficient tax structure). Weyerhaeuser is a particularly interesting addition because its current market cap is less than estimates of the timberland value. In addition, a probable change in the tax structure will likely result in a significant increase is share price. So let's create a basket with three to six of these stocks and forget the ETF. It will be more reflective of a timberland investment.
But remember, too, that it is NOT timberland. It is stock - be that good or bad. On the positive side, the stock basket is much more liquid than a timberland investment. The stable, continuously rising value of timberland will be absent. Daily values will change with the stock market. Value will rise and fall with major market influences like housing. Quarterly profit will impact the stock price (no matter how foolish). Last week an analyst reported that Potlatch was a better buy than Plum Creek. I checked the stock prices for the two of them and Potlatch was up about 3.5% and Plum Creek was down by 3.5%!!! The value of the timberland at neither company had changed one penny but the difference in value of the two companies was 7%! These types of moves may be foolish but they are also reality.
So..., this may raise a couple of questions in your mind. First question: How can we do a better job at selecting stocks to "kind of" mirror timberland investments than a professional investment firm like Claymore? Answer: Due to laws and regulations that apply to mutual funds and ETF's, they are restricted from taking a position that exceeds 5% of the fund. That means that they must take a bare bones number of 20 different companies in the ETF and there are not 20 companies out there that even approach being true timberland plays. We win not because we are better but because we are blessed with more flexiblity.
Second question: How could Business Week's assesment be so far off? Answer: ?? --Brian
Friday, February 1, 2008
Employee Buyout of FIA
Charley Tarver will sell Forestry Investment Associates (which I think was the first TIMO, one of the first for sure) to its employees. The employee buyout will be funded with capital provided by Asset Management Finance Corporation which will assume a financial interest in FIA. The management team, consisting of L. Michael Kelly, V. Scott Bond, Samuel R. Grice, Charles L. VanOver and Marc A. Walley will maintain a controlling ownership interest in the firm.
"Launched in 1986, Forest Investment Associates manages approximately $2.8 billion in assets, overseeing broadly diversified portfolios of timberland on behalf of state and municipal retirement systems, corporate pension plans, endowments, foundations, family offices and private commingled funds. Timberland has become an increasingly popular asset class among institutional investors. It provides portfolio diversification, having low correlation with traditional equities and real estate, and acts as a hedge against inflation."
If you are an employee in another firm looking for a way to do a buyout, you might want to talk to AMF. According to David Chalfin, Vice President at AMF, “We feel fortunate to partner with the team at FIA and to assist them in achieving this milestone transaction. We look forward to facilitating management buyouts with other successful management teams in the investment management industry.” Read all about it. --Brian
"Launched in 1986, Forest Investment Associates manages approximately $2.8 billion in assets, overseeing broadly diversified portfolios of timberland on behalf of state and municipal retirement systems, corporate pension plans, endowments, foundations, family offices and private commingled funds. Timberland has become an increasingly popular asset class among institutional investors. It provides portfolio diversification, having low correlation with traditional equities and real estate, and acts as a hedge against inflation."
If you are an employee in another firm looking for a way to do a buyout, you might want to talk to AMF. According to David Chalfin, Vice President at AMF, “We feel fortunate to partner with the team at FIA and to assist them in achieving this milestone transaction. We look forward to facilitating management buyouts with other successful management teams in the investment management industry.” Read all about it. --Brian
Tuesday, January 8, 2008
Molpus Acquires 195,000 Acres
"The Molpus Woodlands Group, LLC (MWG), a timberland investment management organization, headquartered in Jackson, Mississippi has announced the successful purchase of 195,000 acres of timberland. The acreage is located in five states as follows: New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama. This acquisition increases the company's total acreage under management to 665,675. "
" These purchases mark the first acquisitions outside the southern United States for MWG. This acreage will be managed as a long-term timber investment on behalf of an institutional investor."
Read entire article.
" These purchases mark the first acquisitions outside the southern United States for MWG. This acreage will be managed as a long-term timber investment on behalf of an institutional investor."
Read entire article.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Land Deals: WEYCO, GFP, Sierra Pacific, TCG, Rosboro
The following is from a WEYCO news release on WEYCO's website:
Weyerhaeuser, Global Forest Partners Complete Sale of New Zealand Assets:
"FEDERAL WAY, Wash., Oct. 31 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Weyerhaeuser Company (NYSE: WY) and Global Forest Partners today announced the completion of the sale and transfer of assets from their former joint venture to GFP sole ownership after receiving the necessary government approvals."
"Under the agreement, GFP investment funds will acquire Weyerhaeuser New Zealand, Inc., and Weyerhaeuser's interest in the Nelson JV assets. These assets include approximately 67,000 productive hectares of plantation forests in the Nelson/Marlborough region and the Kaituna sawmill at Renwick, which has a log input capacity on a single shift of 80,000 cubic meters annually."
"Terms of the agreement were not disclosed."
------------------------------------------------------
The following copyrighted news article is supplied with permission and the courtesy of Forestweb. You can visit their site at www.forestweb.com.
Sierra Pacific acquires 140,000 acres of Washington timberland from The Campbell Group; simultaneously buys/sells off 43,000 Oregon acres to Rosboro
Oct 26, 2007 — Forestweb
By Audrey Dixon
SAN DIEGO, Calif., October 26, 2007 (Forestweb) — Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) has acquired 140,000 acres of Washington timberlands from The Campbell Group (TCG), plus another 43,000 acres in Oregon that it simultaneously sold off to Rosboro.
Mark Pawlicki, Director of Governmental Affairs for Redding, Calif., based SPI, confirmed earlier this week the company had acquired the Washington land very recently but declined to divulge any more details.
Industry sources told Forestweb it had been a two-part transaction with TCG, and that about 40,000 acres of Oregon timberland had been sold to Springfield, Ore., based Rosboro.
Rosboro's CFO Scott Nelson confirmed Friday afternoon that his company had acquired 43,000 acres in western Oregon from SPI at the same time it completed its transaction with TCG, on September 27.
All news reports are copyrighted by the respective papers.
Weyerhaeuser, Global Forest Partners Complete Sale of New Zealand Assets:
"FEDERAL WAY, Wash., Oct. 31 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Weyerhaeuser Company (NYSE: WY) and Global Forest Partners today announced the completion of the sale and transfer of assets from their former joint venture to GFP sole ownership after receiving the necessary government approvals."
"Under the agreement, GFP investment funds will acquire Weyerhaeuser New Zealand, Inc., and Weyerhaeuser's interest in the Nelson JV assets. These assets include approximately 67,000 productive hectares of plantation forests in the Nelson/Marlborough region and the Kaituna sawmill at Renwick, which has a log input capacity on a single shift of 80,000 cubic meters annually."
"Terms of the agreement were not disclosed."
------------------------------------------------------
The following copyrighted news article is supplied with permission and the courtesy of Forestweb. You can visit their site at www.forestweb.com.
Sierra Pacific acquires 140,000 acres of Washington timberland from The Campbell Group; simultaneously buys/sells off 43,000 Oregon acres to Rosboro
Oct 26, 2007 — Forestweb
By Audrey Dixon
SAN DIEGO, Calif., October 26, 2007 (Forestweb) — Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) has acquired 140,000 acres of Washington timberlands from The Campbell Group (TCG), plus another 43,000 acres in Oregon that it simultaneously sold off to Rosboro.
Mark Pawlicki, Director of Governmental Affairs for Redding, Calif., based SPI, confirmed earlier this week the company had acquired the Washington land very recently but declined to divulge any more details.
Industry sources told Forestweb it had been a two-part transaction with TCG, and that about 40,000 acres of Oregon timberland had been sold to Springfield, Ore., based Rosboro.
Rosboro's CFO Scott Nelson confirmed Friday afternoon that his company had acquired 43,000 acres in western Oregon from SPI at the same time it completed its transaction with TCG, on September 27.
All news reports are copyrighted by the respective papers.
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Timberland Investment Returns
Here is a link to economist Jack Lutz' quarterly newsletter "That Was Then, This is Now". It is a very well done and interesting article on how the returns from timberland have changed over the past two decades.
In addition to timberland returns, and the "shocks" that impact them, he compares and correlates the returns to other major investment alternatives. It is well worth reading. --Brian
In addition to timberland returns, and the "shocks" that impact them, he compares and correlates the returns to other major investment alternatives. It is well worth reading. --Brian
Thursday, August 30, 2007
RMK Timberlands acquires 115,000 acres in Texas
According to the Daily Report, Regions Financial Corp.’s RMK Timberland Group has purchased 115,000 acres in Texas from Corrigan Timberlands. Although no other information was given, I assume that this is a part of the former International Paper land (managed by Molpus, I beleive) in East Texas. --Brian
Monday, August 6, 2007
Temple-Inland to Sell 1.55 Million Acres of Timberland for $2.38 Billion
Sorry for the long absence folks but here is something to start the week off with. The news release below is from Temple-Inland's web site. On another note, Cambium bought 6,100 acres in Hawaii from Hancock. Read about that. --Brian
________________________________________
AUSTIN, Texas--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 6, 2007--Temple-Inland Inc. (NYSE: TIN) today announced that it entered into a definitive agreement with an investment entity affiliated with The Campbell Group, Inc. to sell 1.55 million acres of timberland for $2.38 billion. The acreage included in the sale consists of 1.38 million acres of land owned in fee and leases covering 175,000 acres.
The transaction is expected to close in fourth quarter 2007. The total consideration is expected to consist almost entirely of installment notes. Roughly 30 days after the sale is closed, the Company expects to pledge the installment notes as collateral for a non-recourse loan. The net cash proceeds from these transactions, after current taxes and transaction costs, are anticipated to be approximately $1.8 billion. Following the pledge of installment notes, the Company expects to use the majority of these proceeds to pay a special dividend, which is currently estimated to be approximately $1.1 billion, or $10.25 per share, to its common stockholders. The remaining approximately $700 million of the cash proceeds will be used to reduce debt.
The transaction includes a 20-year fiber supply agreement for pulpwood and a 12-year fiber supply agreement for sawtimber, the terms of which are both subject to extension. Fiber will be purchased at market prices. The agreements further require that the timberlands will continue to be managed and third-party certified under the requirements of the Sustainable Forestry Initiative(R) Standard. In addition, The Campbell Group and its investors have agreed to continue Temple-Inland's high conservation standards and focus on environmental stewardship.
"The sale of our timberland is a milestone in the execution of our previously announced transformation plan," said Kenneth M. Jastrow, II, chairman and chief executive officer. "The fiber supply agreements will enable us to capture a significant portion of the fiber grown on these lands. The quality of our forest is a tribute to our forest team's superb management of these timberlands for many years. We are pleased that many of our current forest employees will have the opportunity to continue managing these lands under new ownership."
John Gilleland, president of The Campbell Group, said, "The Temple-Inland forests represent some of the best managed, highest quality industrial timberlands in the world. Acquiring these forests enables our firm to further its strong commitment to timberland as a long-term asset class, and to continuing our history of sound environmental stewardship. We are looking forward to managing these lands responsibly and to producing the best product for our customers and quality results for our clients."
Transformation Update
As previously announced, Temple-Inland's transformation plan includes: -- Retaining its manufacturing operations - Corrugated Packaging
and Building Products - as Temple-Inland Inc.;
-- Spinning off its financial services operation, Guaranty
Financial Group, in a tax-free distribution to shareholders;
-- Spinning off its real estate operation, Forestar Real Estate
Group, in a tax-free distribution to shareholders; and
-- Selling the Company's strategic timberland.
Temple-Inland reiterated that it is on track to complete its transformation plan by the end of 2007.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. served as financial advisers and Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP served as legal advisor to Temple-Inland in connection with the transaction. Morrison & Foerster LLP and Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt served as legal advisors to The Campbell Group in connection with the transaction.
Temple-Inland Inc. operates four business segments: corrugated packaging, forest products, real estate and financial services. Temple-Inland's common stock (TIN) is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Temple-Inland's address on the World Wide Web is www.templeinland.com.
The Campbell Group, LLC (www.campbellgroup.com) is a full-service timberland investment management company headquartered in Portland, Oregon. The company is focused exclusively on acquiring and managing high quality, investment grade forestland on behalf of institutional investors to produce superior risk-adjusted returns.
This release contains "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the federal securities laws. These statements reflect management's current views with respect to future events and are subject to risk and uncertainties. We note that a variety of factors and uncertainties could cause our actual results to differ significantly from the results discussed in the forward-looking statements. Factors and uncertainties that might cause such differences include, but are not limited to: general economic, market, or business conditions; the opportunities (or lack thereof) that may be presented to us and that we may pursue; fluctuations in costs and expenses including the costs of raw materials, purchased energy, and freight; demand for new housing; accuracy of accounting assumptions related to pension and postretirement costs, impaired assets, and the allowance for credit losses; competitive actions by other companies; changes in laws or regulations and actions or restrictions of regulatory agencies; our ability to execute certain strategic and business improvement initiatives, including the Transformation Plan; closing the transactions described in this report; and other factors, many of which are beyond our control.
CONTACT: Temple-Inland Inc., AustinChris L. Nines, 512-434-5587SOURCE: Temple-Inland Inc.
________________________________________
AUSTIN, Texas--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 6, 2007--Temple-Inland Inc. (NYSE: TIN) today announced that it entered into a definitive agreement with an investment entity affiliated with The Campbell Group, Inc. to sell 1.55 million acres of timberland for $2.38 billion. The acreage included in the sale consists of 1.38 million acres of land owned in fee and leases covering 175,000 acres.
The transaction is expected to close in fourth quarter 2007. The total consideration is expected to consist almost entirely of installment notes. Roughly 30 days after the sale is closed, the Company expects to pledge the installment notes as collateral for a non-recourse loan. The net cash proceeds from these transactions, after current taxes and transaction costs, are anticipated to be approximately $1.8 billion. Following the pledge of installment notes, the Company expects to use the majority of these proceeds to pay a special dividend, which is currently estimated to be approximately $1.1 billion, or $10.25 per share, to its common stockholders. The remaining approximately $700 million of the cash proceeds will be used to reduce debt.
The transaction includes a 20-year fiber supply agreement for pulpwood and a 12-year fiber supply agreement for sawtimber, the terms of which are both subject to extension. Fiber will be purchased at market prices. The agreements further require that the timberlands will continue to be managed and third-party certified under the requirements of the Sustainable Forestry Initiative(R) Standard. In addition, The Campbell Group and its investors have agreed to continue Temple-Inland's high conservation standards and focus on environmental stewardship.
"The sale of our timberland is a milestone in the execution of our previously announced transformation plan," said Kenneth M. Jastrow, II, chairman and chief executive officer. "The fiber supply agreements will enable us to capture a significant portion of the fiber grown on these lands. The quality of our forest is a tribute to our forest team's superb management of these timberlands for many years. We are pleased that many of our current forest employees will have the opportunity to continue managing these lands under new ownership."
John Gilleland, president of The Campbell Group, said, "The Temple-Inland forests represent some of the best managed, highest quality industrial timberlands in the world. Acquiring these forests enables our firm to further its strong commitment to timberland as a long-term asset class, and to continuing our history of sound environmental stewardship. We are looking forward to managing these lands responsibly and to producing the best product for our customers and quality results for our clients."
Transformation Update
As previously announced, Temple-Inland's transformation plan includes: -- Retaining its manufacturing operations - Corrugated Packaging
and Building Products - as Temple-Inland Inc.;
-- Spinning off its financial services operation, Guaranty
Financial Group, in a tax-free distribution to shareholders;
-- Spinning off its real estate operation, Forestar Real Estate
Group, in a tax-free distribution to shareholders; and
-- Selling the Company's strategic timberland.
Temple-Inland reiterated that it is on track to complete its transformation plan by the end of 2007.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. served as financial advisers and Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP served as legal advisor to Temple-Inland in connection with the transaction. Morrison & Foerster LLP and Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt served as legal advisors to The Campbell Group in connection with the transaction.
Temple-Inland Inc. operates four business segments: corrugated packaging, forest products, real estate and financial services. Temple-Inland's common stock (TIN) is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Temple-Inland's address on the World Wide Web is www.templeinland.com.
The Campbell Group, LLC (www.campbellgroup.com) is a full-service timberland investment management company headquartered in Portland, Oregon. The company is focused exclusively on acquiring and managing high quality, investment grade forestland on behalf of institutional investors to produce superior risk-adjusted returns.
This release contains "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the federal securities laws. These statements reflect management's current views with respect to future events and are subject to risk and uncertainties. We note that a variety of factors and uncertainties could cause our actual results to differ significantly from the results discussed in the forward-looking statements. Factors and uncertainties that might cause such differences include, but are not limited to: general economic, market, or business conditions; the opportunities (or lack thereof) that may be presented to us and that we may pursue; fluctuations in costs and expenses including the costs of raw materials, purchased energy, and freight; demand for new housing; accuracy of accounting assumptions related to pension and postretirement costs, impaired assets, and the allowance for credit losses; competitive actions by other companies; changes in laws or regulations and actions or restrictions of regulatory agencies; our ability to execute certain strategic and business improvement initiatives, including the Transformation Plan; closing the transactions described in this report; and other factors, many of which are beyond our control.
CONTACT: Temple-Inland Inc., AustinChris L. Nines, 512-434-5587SOURCE: Temple-Inland Inc.
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