Some Timberland Transactions and Other Stuff

I've had several requests for an update on issues surrounding timberland investments and transactions to date for 2011 so I am posting a chart of the transactions of which I am aware. I will also make a comment or two on conservation easements and on who is

Seeing the Forest for Its Hedges

Under the category of shameless self promotion, here is a link to an article in last Sunday's New York Times written by Tim Gray and entitled "Seeing the Forest for Its Hedges".  It discusses different options for investing in timberland (TIMOs, REITs, ETFs and direct investment of smaller tracts). --Brian

A BRIEF TIMO BACKGROUNDER

In discussions with newcomers considering investments in timberland or the publicly traded timber REITs, I frequently find that there is substantial misunderstandings about what a TIMO is and what the TIMO role is in the investment community. This backgrounder is intended to answer those questions. For a much deeper understanding of TIMOs, here is a link to an outstanding and in depth report prepared by Cliff Hickman with the U.S. Forest Service. It was prepared in early 2007 so some of the numbers are out of date but, other than that, it is the best researched report on TIMOs and REITs that I have seen.

What is a TIMO?

A Timberland Investment Management Organization. Note that the first word is timberland, not timber as it is so often written. There is a big difference. Timber refers to trees, timberland is land with trees on it! Many news articles in well-known financial news publications (WSJ, Barron's) have confused the two in recent years, which has led to significant confusion surrounding pricing and values of timberland. The second key point is that TIMOs do not own land; they buy land, manage it and sell it for their clients. They have teams experienced in both forest management and portfolio management. For this advice and service, they charge a fee.

Some history…

During the 1980’s, institutional investors began recognizing the value of adding timberland to their portfolios. By the early to mid 1990’s, there was a call by many analysts in the investment community for the pulp and paper companies to monetize their timberlands to reduce debt. More favorable federal income tax rates and accounting policies applied to the TIMO’s clients than the pulp and paper companies, which made the timberland more valuable for the former compared to the latter. Growth of the TIMOs was rapid as investors sought to acquire timberland and the pulp and paper companies sought to dispose of it. The companies that did not sell their land generally converted to the REIT form of corporate structure to provide higher after-tax returns for their shareholders.

Who are the TIMO’s clients?

They are large institutional investors with a focus on financial objectives, many of which are tax exempt. Specifically:

• Pension funds
• Public retirement systems (CalPERS, the California public employee retirement system, was one of the first and largest timberland investors). European pension funds invest in U.S. timberland also and U.S. funds own timberland in other countries.
• Corporate pension funds
• University endowments (Harvard and Yale were among the first institutional timberland investors)
• High net worth individuals and families
• Hedge funds
• Foundations

Note that the clients are all large investors.  The largest clients generally acquire land in separate accounts while some of the smaller clients participate in accounts with commingled funds. TIMOs are not structured to accommodate most individual investors (there are other good options for individuals though).

How do TIMOs differ from the so-called Timber REITs?

TREITs, or Timber Real Estate Investment Trusts, own the timberland, TIMOs do not. The publicly traded TREITs are Plum Creek (PCL), Potlatch (PCH), Rayonier (RYN) and soon to be Weyerhaeuser (WY). The tax structure for REITs allows the profits to be passed through to the shareholders avoiding the double taxation associated with the C corporations. That tax efficiency is why Weyerhaeuser is converting to a REIT.

How much timberland do the TIMOs manage?

The TIMOs manage approximately 25 million acres worth more than $30 billion. The three REITs (not counting Weyerhaeuser) own about 11 million acres worth about $15 billion. Including Weyerhaeuser, the REITs own about 17 million acres worth about $28 billion.

Who are some of the TIMOs?

Below is a list, in alphabetical order, of some of the largest TIMOs. All of them have web sites that you can google to get additional information about them.

• Conservation Forestry
• Forest Capital Partners
• Forest Investment Associates
• Forest Systems
• Global Forest Partners
• GMO Renewable Resources
• Hancock Timber Resources Group
• Lyme Timber Company
• Molpus Woodlands Group
• ORM/Pope Resources
• Resource Management Services
• RMK Timberland Group
• The Campbell Group
• The Forestland Group
• Timberland Investment Resources
• TimberVest
• Wagner Forest Management

Are there differences between TIMOs?

Yes. They have different investment philosophies that appeal to investors with differing objectives. For example, The Forestland Group invests primarily in natural forests, particularly hardwood. The Hancock Timber Resources Group puts an emphasis on forest technology to improve timber yields and financial returns. Some TIMOs focus on acquiring “conservation land” or land that can have “conservation easements” quickly sold and separated from the fee ownership. Some TIMOs have good information systems with strong financial controls and some do not. Some conduct field audits, some do not. Some have outstanding technical groups in-house, some contract it outside. Some manage the timberland themselves and some contract with consulting foresters. All of these issues should be weighed by investors and the right TIMO selected based on the objectives of the investor.

This post can be downloaded as a pdf here. Visit  the Timberland Strategies web site here. --Brian

Email: jbfiacco@gmail.com

Timberland Transaction Update

Major timberland transactions have slowed considerably but some continue to close. I wrote an article for Forest Landowners Magazine (THE TREND IN TIMBERLAND PRICES) that was supposed to be published in October but the publishing date was postponed until late November so I thought I would do a little update on transactions to date for this year. From the list below, you can see that there are quite a few transactions but relatively few large ones.

Here is an insightful comment from Plum Creek's 3rd Quarter Earnings Conference Call.  "We have not noted any significant changes to our rural land markets since the last quarter's call. In general, rural land values were off approximately 25% in higher value regions such as Florida, portions of Georgia, and Montana. Rural land sales in lower priced markets such as Mississippi and Northern Wisconsin remain fairly active. Prices in these markets have been more resilient and appear to be off 15% or less from their peaks." The comment is supported by the Rayonier sale above for $1,200 per acre which is a conglomerate of sales showing that Florida is definitely a soft area. Some of the other companies are reporting very little decline in the rural/recreational market.

In spite of these stated declines, there remains little sale activity supporting significant declines in institutional timberland values. Several of the larger timberland sales were at a solid price but there are too few to say prices have not declined. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this list is the names of the sellers. They are almost ALL public companies selling land to try to protect their dividends (or in Forestar's case, the entire company!). The one TIMO sale was at a very good price.

If I have missed any sales, and I probably have, send me an email to jbfiacco@gmail.com. As always, comments and differing opinions are appreciated (especially if supported by facts).

My last post had an error in a link. Click here if you would like to see the PDF of the presentation The Forest Industry of the Future: What will it look like. . --Brian

The Dichotomy in Timberland Valuation

The issue in today’s post concerns why the transaction price of timberland has shown little or no decline in value but the stock price of the publicly traded companies that own timberland has declined dramatically. I will also look at what I think is happening in the timberland market today and how I see the market for timberland investment. But first, let’s set the stage.

In January, I did a post that included some graphs developed from my timberland transaction file. I was looking to see if the data supported a wide-spread belief that timberland values had dropped. The thinking was that housing starts declined, which caused a drop in lumber prices, which caused a drop in stumpage prices (all true), which caused a drop in timberland prices. You can read that post here How Much Did Timberland Values Fall in 2008? The data did not support the logic and did not show any evidence of a significant decline in timberland values. (For those that sent emails saying my opinion was wrong – that was not my opinion, it was just the data). I also wondered what the NCREIF Timberland Index would look like when it was released. The publicly accessible portion of the NCREIF website showed quarterly returns that compound to a 9.5% total return for the timberland in its index in 2008 but the components of the return are not broken out. A recent report by Brookfield Timberlands Management, distributed by Forestweb, shows the NCREIF return broken down by earnings and capital appreciation.

NCREIF TIMBERLAND INDEX

The significant decline in the blue portion of the graph reflects the decline in housing/lumber/stumpage/earnings. The green portion, Capital Appreciation, can be viewed somewhat (not perfect) as a surrogate of the change in timberland value as determined from tract sales and appraisals of tracts – all of which are a part of the index. Note the green from 2000 to 2002. This data certainly contains no indication of a 2008 decline in the price of timberland either.

Below is another graph that I found interesting. It is from the Timberland Report VOL. 10, NO. 2; by the James W. Sewall Company, a highly respected firm with a very long record in the timberland investment community.

From my perspective, the important take-a-way from this graph is that the old correlation between timberland values and housing starts fell apart. We can speculate as to why and we can speculate as to whether the correlation will return but it’s pretty clear that the conventional wisdom has not prevailed during this economic downturn. Another graph in the report reinforces the historical correlations between housing starts and stumpage prices. That correlation did hold as all timber owners know only too well. You can read the entire Sewall report here(recommended).

Now, let’s take a look at the price of common stock in some of the publicly traded companies that have timberland holdings that represent a significant share of the companies’ assets and see how share prices were impacted last year. Ownership structures of these companies include timber REITs, “C” corporations and limited partnerships but for my purposes today, I will refer to them collectively as “timberland companies”. Let’s look at this chart I made from Google.

It’s hard to see but the blue line just above Weyerhaeuser (green line) is the S&P 500. Weyerhaeuser took an early hit because it has such a major direct investment in housing. I read somewhere that it is the 17th largest home builder. The rest of the timber companies fell about the same amount as, and in synch with, the general market. My conclusion is that the timber companies stock price tracks the stock market rather than with the timberland market. Not a “pure play” in the bunch. Down about 50% when timberland prices held pretty steady.

I have long been a skeptic of the “pure play” concept of acquiring timberland companies (or an ETF) as a surrogate for timberland ownership. Even if 100% of the assets owned by the company were timberland, I would still be a skeptic and here is why.

Timberland investors use metrics based on a time horizon of 10 to 50 or more years. The key metrics are based on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses over that time horizon. If you would like to read more about timber valuation than you really want to know, you can do that here. The metrics used by those that analyze stock value are usually based on very short term future cash flows of a year or two (no need to discount those!). The inherent assumption is that the stock price will respond to very short term (a few quarters or few years at most) cash flows and that the stock will be bought or sold in that time frame. Some of the most referenced metrics are based on what happened last year rather than what is expected to happen in the future (current P/E for example). The Warren Buffets in the crowd that actually do take a long term view of stock investing are a clear minority today and I’m sure that DCF is an integral part of their valuation. Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not saying that one way is right and that the other way is wrong, only that they produce different results and that creates a dichotomy in value and an opportunity for long term investors. Given all this, is it any wonder that the stock of the timberland companies has fallen dramatically with the general market decline? The value of their timberland portfolio is based upon the very depressed earnings reflecting current stumpage prices rather than the DCF of future stumpage prices!

At this point, I reach two conclusions (and I know that some will not agree)

1. Timberland values have fallen little if any, and
2. The timberland value component of the timberland companies’ stock price has fallen dramatically

And therein is the opportunity.

Here is another stock chart just like the one above except Forestar Group has been added. If ever there was a pure play for timberland/HBU, this is it. Other than some OGM, that is its only asset!

The “Pure Play” Fallacy

In spite of that, the stock price of Forestar dropped over 80% - the worst of the group. So much for the “pure play” concept. If you want to invest in timberland, you need to own timberland, not stock!

Think about this. Is it possible that the assets of Forestar were worth five times as much in June as they were in November? Some folks sure didn’t think so. To name a couple, Holland Ware and Carl Icahn. Both recognize the dichotomy in valuation methodology between timberland and the valuation of the stock in timberland companies! Both made some serious money with that little bit of information and a lot of cash. Buy at $3 - $4/share, offer $15.00 (still undervalued), sell at $12 or so. Not bad. And the $15/share offer? Even that was well under the underlying value of the timberland/HBU asset.

Okay. We understand what happened in 2008. What is happening to timberland prices now and what will happen in the future? I still have seen no significant decline in transaction prices regardless of the emails I get claiming dramatic declines in prices (no transaction details attached). There is a slowing of transactions, at least one announced major transaction (St. Joe) did not close and several tracts that were put on the market were pulled off. What does this mean for the future?

It may mean that prices will fall. It may mean that buyers are holding their cash until this economic downturn, recession, depression, or crisis begins to resolve itself. I don’t know what the future holds but I do know that there is a lot of pension fund and other cash out there that will be invested somewhere. Today it is going into money market accounts and just kind of sitting there. Barron’s reported about a week ago that there was $4 trillion in money market funds which is about one-half the market cap of the entire U. S. stock market. That is a lot of money and I doubt that it will all stay in cash. At some point, some will go back into the market, some to commodities, some elsewhere and some to timberland.

Long term, I remain bullish on timberland but, in the short-term, I think that stock in the timberland companies is a better investment. The downside is less than timberland and the upside is much, much greater. If you follow Holland Ware, you won’t starve. --Brian
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Visit my website at Timberland Strategies
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Rayonier wants to sell 40% of its NZ holdings

The following is a news release from Rayoniers web site. --Brian
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Rayonier Announces Intent to Offer New Zealand Timberland for Sale

JACKSONVILLE, Fla.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 19, 2008--Rayonier (NYSE:RYN) today announced that the New Zealand joint venture Matariki Forests, in which it has a 40 percent interest, has decided to offer its timberlands for sale. Matariki Forests owns the third largest forest estate in New Zealand, with approximately 343,000 acres of timberland well positioned throughout the country. In addition to its equity interest, Rayonier provides timberland management services to the joint venture.
"The decision to offer this high quality Radiata pine estate allows the joint venture to tap the private market's strong appetite for timberland as an attractive asset class," said Rayonier chairman, president and CEO, Lee M. Thomas. "We will work with the other Matariki owners to select a financial advisor and begin marketing this property within the next three months."
A sale of the joint venture's timberlands would be expected to close sometime in 2009.

Timberland – Keep it or sell it?

I like to look forward and speculate about what is going to happen. Sometimes with a good analysis, sometimes with just a good guess. Either way, nobody can say that you’re right or wrong. Only time can do that. And it does.

But once in awhile it is good to look back. Maybe to say “I told you so” or perhaps to see just how foolish I have been with some of my prognostications. Either way, the value is in the looking.

About ten years or so ago the TIMO sector was starting to grow in earnest. It was clear (to some at least) that C Corp ownership of timberland was probably not the best ownership structure. The large timberland owners were all Integrated Forest Products Companies (IFPCs) and some had already been experimenting with different corporate structures such as LPs and REITs. Most were maintaining the status quo and capitalizing on TIMO investor driven demand by selling off their “non-strategic” holdings to generate cash or reportable earnings.

By 2000, the pulp and paper industry was about five years into some very bad times from a profitability standpoint. The investment community (and I know many of my readers are market analysts - so pay attention to this little trip back in time), had one mantra. “Sell your timberland and pay down debt”. The decade before that it was all about percent self-sufficiency. The higher the level of self-sufficiency (the more land owned), the more favorable the analysts view of the company. Mantras change abruptly.

Interesting discussions occurred in many offices during the two or three years before and after 2000. (“Let’s keep the land and sell the mills!” – Heresy!). Reactions to the analysts’ demands (or maybe to the poor profits) were varied. In some cases, corporate management bought into the analysts view, other managers explored and ultimately implemented the evolving REIT structure and one major company maintained the status quo. So who was right? Perhaps this chart will shed a little light on the issue.

Picking Weyerhaeuser as the major representative (about the only one actually) of the “status quo” decision makers, I’ve compared their stock prices to the REIT crowd (PCH, PCL and RYN) and the timberland divestures crowd (represented by IP, MWV and LPX) over the past five years. What does this tell us?

The status quo decision was right in the middle with respect to stock price performance.

An examination of the three timberland sellers (those that restructured based on the advice and pressure of the analysts) were all losers – some big time losers. Analysts pay attention. Your advice and pressure destroyed a great deal of shareholder value. But then again, it wasn’t your fault. The fault lies squarely with the senior management that took those companies down that course. The final chapter has yet to be written for these firms but it sure doesn’t look like the right decision at this point.

The shareholders of the three companies that saw the REIT opportunity and charted their own course through a complex and somewhat risky maze were very well rewarded relative to the others. All three of these companies actually acquired land over the five year period. What a difference is made by good strategic decisions on the part of senior management. History pins the Gold Medal on Rayonier’s senior management team. –Brian