The Dichotomy in Timberland Valuation

The issue in today’s post concerns why the transaction price of timberland has shown little or no decline in value but the stock price of the publicly traded companies that own timberland has declined dramatically. I will also look at what I think is happening in the timberland market today and how I see the market for timberland investment. But first, let’s set the stage.

In January, I did a post that included some graphs developed from my timberland transaction file. I was looking to see if the data supported a wide-spread belief that timberland values had dropped. The thinking was that housing starts declined, which caused a drop in lumber prices, which caused a drop in stumpage prices (all true), which caused a drop in timberland prices. You can read that post here How Much Did Timberland Values Fall in 2008? The data did not support the logic and did not show any evidence of a significant decline in timberland values. (For those that sent emails saying my opinion was wrong – that was not my opinion, it was just the data). I also wondered what the NCREIF Timberland Index would look like when it was released. The publicly accessible portion of the NCREIF website showed quarterly returns that compound to a 9.5% total return for the timberland in its index in 2008 but the components of the return are not broken out. A recent report by Brookfield Timberlands Management, distributed by Forestweb, shows the NCREIF return broken down by earnings and capital appreciation.

NCREIF TIMBERLAND INDEX

The significant decline in the blue portion of the graph reflects the decline in housing/lumber/stumpage/earnings. The green portion, Capital Appreciation, can be viewed somewhat (not perfect) as a surrogate of the change in timberland value as determined from tract sales and appraisals of tracts – all of which are a part of the index. Note the green from 2000 to 2002. This data certainly contains no indication of a 2008 decline in the price of timberland either.

Below is another graph that I found interesting. It is from the Timberland Report VOL. 10, NO. 2; by the James W. Sewall Company, a highly respected firm with a very long record in the timberland investment community.

From my perspective, the important take-a-way from this graph is that the old correlation between timberland values and housing starts fell apart. We can speculate as to why and we can speculate as to whether the correlation will return but it’s pretty clear that the conventional wisdom has not prevailed during this economic downturn. Another graph in the report reinforces the historical correlations between housing starts and stumpage prices. That correlation did hold as all timber owners know only too well. You can read the entire Sewall report here(recommended).

Now, let’s take a look at the price of common stock in some of the publicly traded companies that have timberland holdings that represent a significant share of the companies’ assets and see how share prices were impacted last year. Ownership structures of these companies include timber REITs, “C” corporations and limited partnerships but for my purposes today, I will refer to them collectively as “timberland companies”. Let’s look at this chart I made from Google.

It’s hard to see but the blue line just above Weyerhaeuser (green line) is the S&P 500. Weyerhaeuser took an early hit because it has such a major direct investment in housing. I read somewhere that it is the 17th largest home builder. The rest of the timber companies fell about the same amount as, and in synch with, the general market. My conclusion is that the timber companies stock price tracks the stock market rather than with the timberland market. Not a “pure play” in the bunch. Down about 50% when timberland prices held pretty steady.

I have long been a skeptic of the “pure play” concept of acquiring timberland companies (or an ETF) as a surrogate for timberland ownership. Even if 100% of the assets owned by the company were timberland, I would still be a skeptic and here is why.

Timberland investors use metrics based on a time horizon of 10 to 50 or more years. The key metrics are based on a discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses over that time horizon. If you would like to read more about timber valuation than you really want to know, you can do that here. The metrics used by those that analyze stock value are usually based on very short term future cash flows of a year or two (no need to discount those!). The inherent assumption is that the stock price will respond to very short term (a few quarters or few years at most) cash flows and that the stock will be bought or sold in that time frame. Some of the most referenced metrics are based on what happened last year rather than what is expected to happen in the future (current P/E for example). The Warren Buffets in the crowd that actually do take a long term view of stock investing are a clear minority today and I’m sure that DCF is an integral part of their valuation. Don’t misunderstand me. I’m not saying that one way is right and that the other way is wrong, only that they produce different results and that creates a dichotomy in value and an opportunity for long term investors. Given all this, is it any wonder that the stock of the timberland companies has fallen dramatically with the general market decline? The value of their timberland portfolio is based upon the very depressed earnings reflecting current stumpage prices rather than the DCF of future stumpage prices!

At this point, I reach two conclusions (and I know that some will not agree)

1. Timberland values have fallen little if any, and
2. The timberland value component of the timberland companies’ stock price has fallen dramatically

And therein is the opportunity.

Here is another stock chart just like the one above except Forestar Group has been added. If ever there was a pure play for timberland/HBU, this is it. Other than some OGM, that is its only asset!

The “Pure Play” Fallacy

In spite of that, the stock price of Forestar dropped over 80% - the worst of the group. So much for the “pure play” concept. If you want to invest in timberland, you need to own timberland, not stock!

Think about this. Is it possible that the assets of Forestar were worth five times as much in June as they were in November? Some folks sure didn’t think so. To name a couple, Holland Ware and Carl Icahn. Both recognize the dichotomy in valuation methodology between timberland and the valuation of the stock in timberland companies! Both made some serious money with that little bit of information and a lot of cash. Buy at $3 - $4/share, offer $15.00 (still undervalued), sell at $12 or so. Not bad. And the $15/share offer? Even that was well under the underlying value of the timberland/HBU asset.

Okay. We understand what happened in 2008. What is happening to timberland prices now and what will happen in the future? I still have seen no significant decline in transaction prices regardless of the emails I get claiming dramatic declines in prices (no transaction details attached). There is a slowing of transactions, at least one announced major transaction (St. Joe) did not close and several tracts that were put on the market were pulled off. What does this mean for the future?

It may mean that prices will fall. It may mean that buyers are holding their cash until this economic downturn, recession, depression, or crisis begins to resolve itself. I don’t know what the future holds but I do know that there is a lot of pension fund and other cash out there that will be invested somewhere. Today it is going into money market accounts and just kind of sitting there. Barron’s reported about a week ago that there was $4 trillion in money market funds which is about one-half the market cap of the entire U. S. stock market. That is a lot of money and I doubt that it will all stay in cash. At some point, some will go back into the market, some to commodities, some elsewhere and some to timberland.

Long term, I remain bullish on timberland but, in the short-term, I think that stock in the timberland companies is a better investment. The downside is less than timberland and the upside is much, much greater. If you follow Holland Ware, you won’t starve. --Brian
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Visit my website at Timberland Strategies
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Valuing Timberland V – The Discount Rate

This is the fifth and final post of a series on timberland valuation. If you missed the first post, which included an Overview plus a discussion on Disaggregation, you can read “Valuing Timberland I” here. The second post focused primarily on productivity and how that fits into today’s appraisal systems which use discounted cash flow techniques to determine the value of timberland. You can read “Valuing Timberland II” here. The third post focused on estimates of timber volumes and values, how we get them, and how to forecast them for future year’s cash flows. Read “Valuing Timberland III” here. The subject of the last post, Valuing Timberland IV, was on the methodologies used in discounted cash flow analysis. Today I’ll focus on the discount rate to be used in the cash flow model.

The “discount rate” is essentially the same thing as the interest rate used in any financial calculation. We have to get the series of future cash flows “discounted” back to the present so we pick the appropriate interest rate to do that. As an example, say you wanted to buy a tract of land and your credit union would lend you the money for 6%. You know there is some risk associated with this so you assign another 2% for risk. You would use a discount rate of 8%. Sounds simple to me.

Let me start off by saying “I don’t know what discount rate to use”! This question is argued by investors, economists and corporate finance types. But understand this, selection of the discount rate is the most important decision made during the valuation process. Let me illustrate.

Many years ago (I was working as a Land Acquisition Forester at the time) I decided to reread Thoreau’s “Walden” which led me to “In the Maine Woods”, “A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers” and “Cape Cod”. Considering my job, Thoreau really got my attention with the following words from “Cape Cod”.

“Between the Pond and East Harbor Village there was an interesting plantation of pitch-pines, twenty or thirty acres in extent, like those which we had already seen from the stage. One who lived near said that the land was purchased by two men for a shilling or twenty-five cents an acre. Some is not considered worth writing a deed for.”

Thoreau had traveled across the Cape in the 1850’s and I had noticed and made mental note of these same pitch pine plantations while visiting there. So what would a Land Acquisition Forester think… “Man, what a buy that would have been!”

What if an investor knew what the values on the Cape would be like in 2008? Would he have bought some of that timberland for $0.25 acre? Maybe, maybe not. Let’s consider the opportunity and create a simple analysis. Let’s say that the investor could foresee all that wonderful HBU land on the Cape and actually KNEW what 2009 land prices would be like. Keeping it simple (so we can isolate the impact of discount rate selection), assume he leased the land out “for taxes” so he had no cash flows (positive or negative) other than the purchase and sale of the land. The data below shows the value of a $0.25/acre investment compounded forward for 150 years.






So…, would the investor have bought the land (for his descendents!!). It very clearly depends on the discount rate that the investor used. I don’t think that there is an acre of scraggly pine plantation on the Cape that could be bought for $1,562/acre and I doubt that you could sell an acre for over $300 million per acre either – not even the Kennedy compound. The value determined clearly depends on the discount rate used. So what discount rate would you have used? Think about that seriously. If the rate is too high (nice to get but will you get it!) you may never have the opportunity to make an investment EXCEPT one that is very risky.

When I was in forestry school (back in the 60’s) we normally used 6% in our forest economics courses. When I was an MBA student (in the late 70’s), we used the company’s marginal cost of capital with an appropriate adjustment for risk. Early in the timberland shift to TIMOs, it was pretty freely discussed that TIMOs were using real rates in the 6% to 8% which was based on the “risk free” rate of return (10 year T-bills at 4%) plus risk adjustment. At the same time, integrated forest products companies with large timberland acreages were using investment hurdle rates significantly above the average or even marginal cost of capital for the firm (a mistake – it should have been based on the marginal cost of capital and risk associated with purchasing and owning more timberland not riskier investments!). The result of this is that high-risk capital investments were subsidized by low-risk timberland ownership. As a general rule, discount rates used by the C corporations were much higher than that used by the TIMOs (rates in the range of 12% - 15% or more). Remember the decision you reached above with the Thoreau example. The C corporations also had to include taxes in the cash flow analyses (reducing cash flow and, subsequently, value) whereas most of the TIMO clients were pension funds and tax exempt. Between the tax payments and high discount rates used by the corporations, it is pretty clear why the TIMOs valued timberland higher than the forest industry.

Note two things from the above discussion. The “appraised value” of a particular tract of timberland, based on comparable sales, was the same for the TIMO buyer and the forest industry seller yet the real valuation for the buyer and seller were very different. As I pointed out in an earlier post; timberland valuation and fair market value are two different things!! The second point: the difference in discount rates used, combined with tax policy, has dramatically changed the face of timberland ownership and forestry practice in this country.

How do inflation and taxes affect the selection of the discount rate? We discussed that somewhat in the post on cash flows. Here are a couple of quotes, also from the Forest Landowners Guide to the Federal Income Tax, Ag. Handbook No. 718.

“it is imperative that the discount (interest) rate used for the analysis include a similar expectation factor for inflation. In summary, both elements of the analysis—cash flow and discount rate—must be kept in comparable terms (with or without inflation and before or after-tax) for reliable results.”

“Forestry investments are very sensitive to the discount rate used because of the long time period between planting and harvest. For after-tax analyses, the correct discount rate is the after-tax rate based on your alternative rate of return. If the next best alternative is a tax-free investment, such as a municipal bond, then the interest rate is used without adjustment, as shown in Table 2-3 for the 10-percent discount rate. If your next best alternative is an investment, such as a corporate bond, that yields 10 percent annually with taxes subtracted before compounding, the correct discount rate is 7.2 percent, after-tax [10 percent x (1 - 0.28 assumed tax rate)]. Alternatively, if the next best alternative is an investment such as an individual retirement account (IRA), certain saving bonds, or an alternative timber investment, where taxes are deferred until the end of the period rather than being subtracted before compounding, then the correct discount rate depends on the length of the investment period and when the costs are incurred and revenues received. Assuming an initial investment, 10 percent interest, and a 28-percent tax subtracted at the end of 34 years, the appropriate discount rate would be 8.94 percent.

Now, if you feel that you still need more info on how to select the right discount rate for a timberland purchase, let me give you a couple more references.

• “Timberland Investments” by Christian Zinkhan, et. al.
• “Discount Rates and Timberland Investments” by Brooks C Mendell in the Timberland Report published by James W. Sewall Company

Finally, it may be worthwhile to speculate a little bit (actually that is what the selection of the discount rate is). Timberland investors have watched as discount rates rose early in this decade followed by decreasing discount rates which resulted in a steady increase in timberland transaction prices (and corresponding values from comparable sale based appraisals). Some TIMOs have left the market so they clearly believe discount rates got too low and pushed prices too high (potential returns too low). Other TIMOs have tried to sell large blocks but pulled them off the market. Perhaps they think discount rates are too high but prices are too low to justify selling?? Or maybe there is less money chasing timberland. This concludes the Timberland Valuation series.

Oh, I almost forgot. Nobody is going to tell you what discount rate to use. That's your call. Comments welcome. --Brian

Valuing Timberland III

This is the third post of a series on timberland valuation. If you missed the first post, which included an Overview plus a discussion on Disaggregation, you can read “Valuing Timberland I” here. The second post focused primarily on productivity and how that fits into today’s appraisal systems which use discounted cash flow techniques to determine the value of timberland. You can read “Valuing Timberland II” here. Today’s post will focus on estimates of timber volumes and values, how we get them, and how we forecast them for future year’s cash flows. We will also take a quick look at the confidence you should place in them.

First, let’s look at timber volumes. What does the cruise say? What does the inventory say? What is the difference? How was the acreage calculated? Are volume estimates tied to a GIS? What are the sources of errors? Can volumes be reasonably audited? If the volume estimate isn’t “right”, the value certainly won’t be!

What is a “cruise”? A survey of forestland to locate timber and estimate its quantity by species, products, size, quality, or other characteristics; the estimate in such a survey. Several different sampling techniques can be used in a cruise. (source: Forestry Terms for Mississippi Landowners, Mississippi State University Extension).

What is an “inventory”? See Cruise (same source). H’mmm. I don’t want to aggravate my Mississippi State colleagues or to argue semantics but there is a huge difference between a cruise and an inventory or, more appropriately, a timber cruise and a forest inventory. To keep it simple, the cruise (as correctly defined above) collects data to estimate the timber volume, quantity, etc. that is there right now. The forest inventory collects much more information which can be used to project volumes and harvests (and other stuff too) into the future. A cruise, as defined above, wouldn’t collect any information on an eight year old loblolly pine plantation. There is little or no volume (perhaps a few trees that meet the limits of merchantability) but there certainly is value. A forest inventory would want to know the species, age, trees/acre, site index and acreage at a minimum. That is the information that is necessary to drive the growth and yield models necessary to estimate future wood flows from the tract. The wood flows become the basis for the cash flows in the appraisal. Perhaps this is just semantics but it is very important to understand the difference and to know what you are looking at.

So the “acquisition cruise” necessary to purchase land is more appropriately referred to as a forest inventory than a cruise. A “timber cruise” is more likely used to determine the immediate value of the timber for a timber sale. Data to drive growth models or cash flow models is not necessary. This distinction is more than academic. The inventory data can be “grown” to provide volume information for appraisals, stand level info for thinning or harvest, projected harvest and regeneration sites for planning site preparation and planting, all at multiple forward points in time. A typical cruise is not designed to do this. Merchantability specs are frequently different between cruises and inventories resulting in differences in volumes reported. Merchantability specs for inventories must be consistent from tract to tract, year to year, cruiser to cruiser and they must be consistent with what the growth models require. Merchantability specs for a timber sale cruise will normally be modified to conform to current demand, market pricing and perhaps even the logger that will be doing the harvesting.

The lesson here is that the user of cruise or inventory information had better understand what he or she is looking at. The cruise/inventory designer needs a clear understanding of the objective of the cruise. Otherwise, expect disappointment.

The sampling intensity of most inventories will not provide adequate data for timber sales. Inventories must collect some information on every stand or stratum (a collection of stands with similar characteristics). The objective of an inventory or cruise is to gather the information that is necessary at an acceptable level of accuracy at the least possible cost. Contrasting the two extremes, consider the case of a 100,000 acre land acquisition compared to a 50 acre mature hardwood timber sale. The objective of the land acquisition inventory is to be accurate enough to generate a reasonably accurate cash flow analysis for the perceived life of the investment (and hence, its present value). Another objective may be to assist in management if the tract is purchased. The resulting inventory would be one with a low sampling intensity but one collecting much information at each sample plot. The inventory is “not accurate” at the stand level. Cost is a serious consideration. If the tract is not purchased, the entire cost of the inventory is wasted. The 50 acre timber sale, on the other hand, has a much higher sampling intensity (perhaps a 100% tally), does not require collecting growth modeling information and requires careful inspection of the quality of each tree relative to current market conditions. The cruise cost/acre is much higher but the payback is immediate and ensured.

Statistics 101: Reiterating an earlier point when addressing timber volume reports; you had better understand what you are looking at. Most well done cruise reports will provide some detail with respect to the statistical accuracy provided by the data. You will see something like “2,216 MBF ± 10% of hardwood sawtimber”. This means, that from a statistical standpoint, the actual volume will be within 10% of the volume estimate 95% of the time, or maybe 90% of the time, or maybe 66% of the time. Maybe you better ask which probability level applies! You will probably also see a volume by species report and perhaps that will also provide statistical error reporting too. If it doesn’t, you should understand that because the sampling intensity for any given species is well below that of all of the species combined, the accuracy of the estimate drops pretty dramatically in a mixed species stand or forest. Now, digging into the cruise report a little deeper you will see that volumes may be reported by species and diameter class. How accurate do you think that will be? If the statistics are reported, that is great. If not, beware the value that you place in the numbers. This information can be useful but you have to assign it the appropriate credibility.

You should also understand that there are other sources of error in a cruise in addition to the statistical sampling error. Examples are the use of incorrect volume tables, measurement errors, poor sample design, calculation errors and, yes, a poor cruiser.

The statistical accuracy of large inventories that have been conducted over several different years and have been brought current using growth models is a different story. I’m not going to get into how to do this because I have no earthly idea how to do it! It can be done by a fairly limited group of forest statisticians, mensurationists and biometricians but it is clearly a difficult task. As a rule of thumb, it is safe to say that the accuracy is somewhat less than what would be calculated using the “ungrown” plots and declines as the number of “grown” years increases.

That’s enough said about cruise reports, inventories and the timber volumes that they report. Now let’s talk about volumes that what will be there tomorrow and the fundamentals of creating a future wood flow.

Future harvest volumes and timing must be done on a stand by stand basis utilizing stand volumes that have been “grown” using yield tables and growth and yield models. The starting base is the stand or strata level inventory and each stand or stratum is grown into the future. Some rule or methodology is then used to select the harvest date to determine the harvest volume for each future year. The result is a wood flow model that, when combined with values, becomes a key component of the cash flow model. More detail about this will be provided in the next post.

This is probably the appropriate place to discuss the integration of a GIS (Geographic Information System) with the timber inventory system when creating the information system used for timberland management. GIS based inventory systems are very common among managers of large tracts of timberland today and sellers normally provide output from these systems to potential buyers. Inventory or cruise volumes may say what is out there but the GIS says exactly WHERE it is on the surface of the earth. A quick check of the validity of the data provided by the seller can be made by auditing selected stands to compare inventory acreage, stocking, volumes, forest types, SI, etc. to the audited values. It doesn’t take much of this type of checking to determine how serious the forest managers have been about the quality and timeliness of their inventory efforts and hence the credence that can be placed in the data provided. The GIS data can be “read” into the GIS based harvest scheduling/ cash flow models and will eventually provide the basis for future management (activity schedules, maps and annual cash flow projections). These are the tools that become the foundation for communications and expectations between the new landowner and the timberland managers. The schedules tell the owner what to expect financially and form the basis of the management plan for the manager. A final point about the GIS based inventory system is that it provides the basis for a field audit in conjunction with the traditional financial audit. In the timberland sector, a financial audit without a corresponding field audit is a serious mistake; in fact, it's not really an audit.

Now let’s discuss timber values. They are down! A lot! If you are selling timber today, that is very important but how important is it with respect to timberland valuation? Should current market conditions be used for valuation?

The comments below are by Rick Holley (from Plum Creek 2008 Q3 Earnings Conference call) answering an analyst’s question about why he thinks timberland values are holding up while other asset classes are declining in value. The quote is a little messed up but his point is clear.

“I think largely because the investor in timberlands, and there’s still a fair amount of capital on the sidelines trying to invest in timberlands, is longer term. They’re looking through this cycle. If anything they’re starting to look at this cycle and lower prices as being more upside when you look out a year or two years or whatever these markets improve. I know there was a recent [Reese] article talking about some transactions that may or may not get done. We’re in the marketplace and we talk to a lot of buyers. We know who the sellers are, and we think all those transactions will in fact get done at very, very good prices, so I think the market is holding up and there’s still a lot of capital chasing very little opportunity…”

The key words above are “looking through…” with respect to timberland prices. To me, that implies that they are also “looking through” with respect to the timber values used in the timberland valuation. I think that if stumpage prices were at all-time highs, buyers would “look through” and see lower prices in the future as well. As Andy Malmquist, my good friend, former employee, and current TIMO guy, used to remind me about so many things… “It’s regressing toward the mean”! Andy actually talks like that.

There are at least three factors to consider for determining future timber values to apply to future volumes – current values, real price increases and inflation. We will discuss how to address inflation in the next post so for now, we will confine the discussion to the first two items.

I am defining “current price” as a “look through” price that is on the trend line for the species,local area and region (huge differences between NE and NW, cherry and red maple). In other words, I am looking for the price that has “regressed to the mean”. This data can be obtained from several different pricing services such as Forest2Market, RISI and Timber-Mart South. In addition, most state forestry commissions (South Carolina Forestry Commission pricing report) or forestry university extension services also provide some level of pricing reports. Local consulting foresters usually know what is available and can also provide first hand local knowledge. Pricing from these sources will provide the baseline for projecting the value of future harvests in the cash flow model.

A real increase in future stumpage prices can and should be incorporated into the model if you think it is justified. U. S. Forest Service reports suggest that sawtimber stumpage prices have increased at a real rate of 2% a year over a very long period of time. An analysis of southern pine stumpage prices by forest economist Jack Lutz reached the following conclusion:

“Our analysis indicates that southern pine sawtimber stumpage prices are mean-reverting, with a 50-year mean of $38.29/ton (based on LDAF data). Those prices have held to that mean through 50 years of timber supply and demand shocks and significant changes in timber harvesting and processing technology. That means we should not expect a significant increase in sawtimber stumpage prices in the near future. This supports the current practice of many timberland investors who are using 0% real appreciation rates in their timberland investment models.”

The future is anybodies guess but the real value increase used should be based upon your view of the future. That’s why there is always a high bidder and a low bidder!

This concludes the discussion on timber volumes and values. The next post in the series will attempt to tie it all together by addressing the methodologies associated with the discounted cash flow models. Comments are welcomed. --Brian

How Much Did Timberland Values Fall in 2008?

My stock portfolio has certainly taken a hit to the downside. The housing market has tanked and the values of many houses and rental units have gone down with it. Stocks of the publicly traded timberland owners have gone down 20 to 60% in the last year or so. The logic is that the decline in housing has caused a drop in lumber price which has created a drop in timber (stumpage) price which has resulted in a corresponding drop in timberland prices. So logically my portfolio has taken a hit on the tree farm side too. But has it?

I do some consulting with market analysts and hedge fund managers interested in valuing timberland and the drivers behind it. The most common question that I have heard recently surrounds the declining value of timberland and just how great that decline is. How can a company like Weyerhaeuser or Plum Creek be properly valued given the logical decline in timberland values? I could give my opinion (and I always do!) but that is not enough.

I have been maintaining a database of the major timberland transactions for over a decade so I wanted to quantify the change for 2008. Below is a chart showing the $/acre sale price trend for the last decade.


















This is pretty interesting. Nationwide, it appears that prices have dropped about 21% following a year where they gained 60%! BUT… it is important to understand the data and what is happening. This database is composed of transactions that total between one and seven million acres in any given year. Also in the database is a “REGIONS” field. Price distortion occurs between years due to the variation in the percentage of sales occurring between regions ($/acre varies significantly between regions). So how does the price per acre change if we just look at a single region? Let’s look at the South.



















Within any particular region, individual transactions will impact any given years weighted average price. In spite of that, the trend is clear and it is difficult to find any argument in the data that supports a decline in timberland pricing – at least in the South. The first reported sale for 2009, Potlatch to RMK, was at $1,745/acre, right in the ballpark.

The Northeast is the only region that did show a drop last year. The acreage sold in the NE was not particularly large (meaning most of the variability was probably due to the variability between tracts) so I would be reluctant to attribute much significance to the decline. There was one significant datapoint though. The Essex Timber to Plum Creek transaction (at $267/acre) pulled the average down. It is important to note that there was a conservation easement on this tract. We should expect to see significantly lower transaction values as more sales occur on tracts with existing conservation easements. The sale of a conservation easement provides revenue in the form of an early payment for HBU land but it can also have a negative impact on future forestry based revenues as well.

So…, what does all of this mean? I can see little or no decline in timberland values. I’ll be curious to see what the NCREIF index on timberland values has to say. The index is based more on appraisals than actual sales but the appraisals SHOULD be based on comparable sales and comparable sales just do not support a decline in appraisal values. If sale prices are not declining, what is wrong with the logic expressed in the first paragraph – declining housing starts means declining timberland values?

Here is my take. First, buyers are “looking through” current timber prices. Sophisticated timberland investors use appraisal techniques that look at cash flow from timber over the planned life of the investment. Those timber values are based on their view of the future, not just today’s market.

Second, more money is chasing fewer acres. A significant amount of timberland is being pulled from the market. Example: almost all of the 161,000 acres of Finch and Pruyn timberland in the Adirondacks will ultimately be withdrawn from production and become a part of the Forest Preserve. An example from the other side of the equation: this week the United Nations announced that its pension fund would diversify its portfolio and seek to acquire timberland. More money chasing fewer acres. Institutions want to diversify their portfolios, particularly by acquiring hard assets.

Third, future wood demand will be impacted by both renewable energy and global warming concerns. We are already seeing pellet mills being built to export pellets to Europe where they are mixed with coal to reduce the amount of carbon tax the utilities must pay. Most forecasters expect to see a similar tax in the U.S. soon.

Fourth, there is evidence that declining interest rates are impacting the discount rates used by institutional timberland purchasers. A declining discount rate drives value up!

These are my thoughts, these are my numbers, and these are my opinions. Comments are welcomed. --Brian

Valuing Timberland I

How much is that tract of timberland worth? Is it worth the asking price? Is fair market value for the tract a good investment? People have gotten rich buying timberland but rest assured that every purchase has not been a good investment! How the land is managed during ownership is important but it pales in comparison to smart purchasing and smart selling. This is the first in a series of posts that looks at how timberland is valued.

Here is a list of the key elements that should be considered when valuing timberland.

Disaggregation: The old expression “The whole is worth more than the sum of the parts” does not appear to be true. Valuing timberland typically begins by identifying the non-timberland values.

Inherent productivity of the land: foresters normally measure this by a quantitative metric referred to as site index.

Forest types and tree species: These are commonly confused but they are not the same thing.

Silviculture and productivity: Planted vs. natural. Fertilization, genetics, etc. What is impact on future yield (value)? Are records of past silvicultural practices available? Are they tied to a GIS?

Timber volumes: What does the cruise say? What does the inventory say? What is the difference? Are they tied to a GIS?

Timber values: What are the drivers? What are the sources of information? Should current market conditions be used for valuation? Or historical, or future estimates? What roles do harvesting costs and trucking costs play in timber value?

Reproduction values: On well managed land, reproduction values may exceed timber values. How do you estimate these values?

Cash flows: Revenue from timber sales, leases; silvicultural expenses, taxes, management fees.

Location: Important? Can it be quantified?

Final sale price: When you sell the land, how much will you get?

Discount rate: or how much of a return do I need to be competitive with investments with a similar risk?

Disaggregation: This first valuation post will address the issue of disaggregation or breaking the total value of the tract down into several components. Add up the value of the components and that’s the value – more or less. Early in my career (mid 1960’s) I was appraising and buying timberland in the Ohio Valley of West Virginia and Ohio. At that time, we cruised the timber and calculated the timber value, used a “table value” to estimate reproduction value (usually minimal or “0”), and assigned a modest “fixed” dollar/acre value for OGM (oil, gas and minerals) if they had not been previously conveyed. We then subtracted those values from the purchase price to determine the residual “bare land value” per acre. The bare land value was compared to past purchases and other available tracts to determine which purchases to make. So… we disaggregated into four pieces at most – timber value, reproduction value, OGM and bare land value. With the exception of the precalculated “reproduction table values”, the time value of money was not considered. Pretty simple. The objective was to manage the entire tract as timberland “forever”, not to sell off the various components. That methodology was pretty typical of the forest industry.

During the same time period (and earlier), land speculators frequently made money by the simplest form of disaggregation with only two buckets. They would buy a tract of timberland, sell the timber and then sell the bare land separately. Many speculators made a living doing this and some got very wealthy. The sum of the parts was worth more than the whole!

The REITs, TIMOs and their institutional investors have taken disaggregation to a whole new level. The objective is to lower the investment of the timberland purchase by quickly spinning off significant assets or components of the initial purchase. In addition to the components discussed above, the investment crowd values and disaggregates Higher and Better Use (HBU) lands, Recreation lands and Conservation Easements. In addition, future HBU lands are factored into the discounted cash flow analysis. The time value of money becomes an important part of the valuation relative to the early speculators that just bought, liquidated the timber and sold the land.

The impact of the disaggregation also has an impact of the final sale price of the investment. Conservation easements can significantly lower the final sale price. Conservation easements that prohibit development are, in a sense, the early sale of HBU land that just hasn’t got there yet. Conservation easements which dictate how the forest is to be managed in the future are much more problematic and should be expected to have a more significant negative impact on the valuation of the timberland when it is sold.

The next post will focus primarily on productivity and how that fits into today’s appraisal systems which use discounted cash flow techniques to determine the value of timberland. --Brian